April 30, 2016
Law & Motion Department Tentative Rulings
  • Law and Motion Department Tentative Ruling Line:  (650) 261-5019
  • Other Judges' tentatives: please reference the appropriate Case Number and Case Caption below and contact the appropriate department.

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In the Superior Court of the State of California

In and for the County of San Mateo

 

Law and Motion Calendar

Judge: Honorable susan irene etezadi

Department 18

 

400 County Center, Redwood City

Courtroom 2L

 

Monday, May 2, 2016

 

IF YOU INTEND TO APPEAR ON ANY CASE ON THIS CALENDAR YOU MUST DO THE FOLLOWING:

 

1. YOU MUST CALL (650) 261-5019 BEFORE 4:00 P.M. TO INFORM THE COURT OF YOUR INTENT TO APPEAR.

2. You must give notice before 4:00 P.M. to all parties of your intent to appear pursuant to California Rules of Court 3.1308(a)(1).

 

Failure to do both items 1 and 2 will result in no oral presentation.

 

Notifying CourtCall with your intent to appear is not an alternative to notifying the court.  

 

All Counsel are reminded to comply with California Rule of Court 3.1110.  The Court will expect all exhibits to be tabbed accordingly. 

 

    Case                  Title / Nature of Case

9:00

1

CIV 530719       SP CONTROLS, INC. VS. WESTERN GEOLOGIC LLC, ET AL.

 

 

SP CONTROLS INC                          CATHERINE W. JOHNSON

WESTERN GEOLOGIC LLC                     CHRISTINE J. GRACCO

 

 

DEMURRER TO FIRst Amended COMPLAINT of SP CONTROLS, INC. BY

WESTERN GEOLOGIC LLC, ET AL.

 

Plaintiff’s request for judicial notice in support of the motion to strike is granted pursuant to Evidence Code §452(c) and (h). 

 

Defendants’ request for judicial notice in support of the demurrer is granted as to items 1-6 pursuant to Evidence Code §452(d) and (c).  The request is denied as to items 7-11.  Defendants have not established that judicial notice of these items is proper under Evidence Code §452. 

 

The motion to strike the demurrer of defendant Western Geologic is DENIED.  Plaintiff has not established that defendant’s corporate rights or powers have been forfeited based on the failure to pay taxes.  Nor have plaintiff’s offered any authority that the failure to register with the Secretary of State, or the inability to be registered, deprives Western of the right to defend this action.  

 

The demurrer on behalf of defendant Western Geologic is overruled as to all causes of action.

 

Defendant has not established that plaintiff’s claims are barred by the statute of limitations.  The gravamen of plaintiff’s claims is defendant’s professional negligence in conducting the Environmental Site Assessment.  Therefore, the two-year statute of limitations in CCP §339(1) is controlling.  However, the expiration of the statute of limitations does not appear clearly and affirmatively from the face of the First Amended Complaint nor matters subject to judicial notice.  Plaintiff’s April 2, 2009 receipt of the correspondence from the County would not necessarily have placed it on notice of defendant’s negligence.

 

With respect to the First Cause of Action for breach of contract, the FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT alleges facts sufficient to show that plaintiff is a third party beneficiary of the contract between Wells Fargo and Western Geologic Inc.  See FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT at ¶¶12-13 and Ex. A.

 

Lastly, defendant has not established that the Second Cause of Action for declaratory relief is redundant or duplicative of issues in the main action. 

 

The demurrer on behalf of defendant Nelson is SUSTAINED WITH LEAVE TO AMEND as to all causes of action to allege facts indicating defendant is bound by the tolling agreement between Western Geologic and plaintiff.  The facts in the FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT indicate that this action was filed more than two years after the date plaintiff alleges it discovered defendant’s negligence and Nelson is not alleged to be a party to the tolling agreement.

 

To the extent plaintiff contends it suffered no harm until the loss of a potential sale of the property in 2014, the facts of the FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT suggest that plaintiff suffered harm at the time it bought the contaminated property.   See CAMSI IV v. Hunter Technology Corp. (1991) 230 Cal.App.3d 1525. 

 

 

If the tentative ruling is uncontested, it shall become the order of the court. Thereafter, moving party is directed to prepare a written order consistent with the Court’s ruling for the Court’s signature, pursuant to California Rules of Court, Rule 3.1312, and to provide notice thereof to the opposing party/counsel as required by law and the California Rules of Court. The order is to be submitted directly to Judge Susan Irene Etezadi, Department 18, for the Court’s signature.

 

MOTION TO STRIKE WESTERN GEOLOGIC, LLC'S DEMURRER TO FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT BY 930 LINDEN AVENUE, LLC

 

SEE ABOVE

 

_____________________________________________________________________


9:00

2

CIV 534096       GUIDO ARNOUT VS. ERIKA BAILEY

 

 

GUIDO ARNOUT                             JOHN H. POULTER

ERIKA BAILEY                             LAURA S. FLYNN

 

 

MOTION TO COMPEL DEFENDANT ERIKA BAILEY'S FURTHER RESPONSES AND REQUEST FOR SANCTIONS BY GUIDO ARNOUT

 

Plaintiff’s Motion to Compel Defendant Erika Bailey’s Further Responses and Request for Sanctions is GRANTED as to Special Interrogatory nos. 27, 28, and 33 because those responses were incomplete or did not answer the question. The remaining interrogatories at issue are irrelevant or were fully answered, therefore the motion to compel is DENIED as to the remaining interrogatories at issue.

 

The request for sanctions is DENIED. The parties met and conferred in good faith, although they continue to disagree.

 

If the tentative ruling is uncontested, it shall become the order of the court. Thereafter, moving party is directed to prepare a written order consistent with the Court’s ruling for the Court’s signature, pursuant to California Rules of Court, Rule 3.1312, and to provide notice thereof to the opposing party/counsel as required by law and the California Rules of Court. The order is to be submitted directly to Judge Susan Irene Etezadi, Department 18, for the Court’s signature.

      _____________________________________________________________________


9:00

3

CIV 534547      FATIMA TEHRANCHI, ET AL. VS. ONE MEDICAL GROUP INC., ET AL.

 

 

FATIMA TEHRANCHI                      PRO/PER

ONE MEDICAL GROUP INC.                STEVEN R. BLACKBURN

 

 

MOTION TO COMPEL SEQUOIA MEDICAL ASSOCIATES, INC. TO FURTHER RESPONSES BY FATIMA TEHRANCHI, ET AL.

 

Plaintiffs FATIMA TEHRANCHI, M.D. and CYRUS SAFAI, M.D.’s Motion to Compel Further Responses to Request for Production of Documents (Set One) is GRANTED.

 

While Defendant SEQUOIA MEDICAL ASSOCIATES, INC. has failed to file any opposition to the instant motion, the Court has reviewed the declaration by Defendant’s counsel, Susan Zeme.  It appears that Defendant takes the position that as a dissolved corporation, it need no longer respond to discovery.  Defendant’s position is erroneous.  California Corporations Code § 2010 states, in pertinent part:

 

(a)    A corporation which is dissolved nevertheless continues to exist for the purpose of winding up its affairs, prosecuting and defending actions by or against it and enabling it to collect and discharge obligations, dispose of and convey its property and collect and divide its assets, but not for the purpose of continuing business except so far as necessary for the winding up thereof.

 

(b)    No action or proceeding to which a corporation is a party abates by the dissolution of the corporation or by reason of proceedings for winding up and dissolution thereof.

 

The Court in Penasquitos, Inc. v. Superior Court (1991) 53 Cal.3d 1180 held:

 

Our review of the statutory scheme leads us to conclude that by the terms of the Corporations Code, the Legislature has decided not to permit a dissolved corporation to make its final exit so long as obligations resulting from its predissolution activities remain undischarged.  Although an injured party whose claim arises after dissolution is generally precluded from pursuing a dissolved corporation’s assets in the hands of its former shareholders, there is no legal barrier to a suit against a dissolved corporation itself for injury or damage that is caused by the corporation’s predissolution activities but occurs or is discovered after the dissolution.  Id. at 1193-1194.

 

In light of the foregoing, Defendant is not relieved from its discovery obligations in this litigation, which arises from Defendant’s predissolution activities.  Defendant is therefore ordered to provide full and complete, verified responses to Request Nos. 8, 9, 14, 16 and 17 no later than May 13, 2016.  Defendant is also ordered to pay monetary sanctions in the amount of $90.00 to Plaintiffs no later than May 13, 2016.

 

If the tentative ruling is uncontested, it shall become the order of the court. Thereafter, moving party is directed to prepare a written order consistent with the Court’s ruling for the Court’s signature, pursuant to California Rules of Court, Rule 3.1312, and to provide notice thereof to the opposing party/counsel as required by law and the California Rules of Court. The order is to be submitted directly to Judge Susan Irene Etezadi, Department 18, for the Court’s signature.

 

_____________________________________________________________________


9:00

4

CIV 536958       TIMOTHY CHEY VS. FACEBOOK, INC.

 

 

TIMOTHY CHEY                          AARON M. GLADSTEIN

FACEBOOK, INC.                        JULIE E. SCHWARTZ

 

 

DEMURRER TO COMPLAINT of CHEY BY FACEBOOK, INC.

 

First Cause of Action (negligent interference) SUSTAINED WITH LEAVE TO AMEND. The Complaint fails to allege an economic relationship with any particular third party. (North Am. Chemical Co. v. Superior Court (1997) 59 Cal. App. 4th 764, 786.) The Court declines to follow the cases relied on by Plaintiff. The case of TYR Sport was based on pleadings standards of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, not California. (TYR Sport Inc. v. Warnaco Swimwear Inc. (C.D. Cal. 2009) 679 F. Supp. 2d 1120, 1139-40.) The Cook case is from the 7th Circuit.

 

Further, the negligent interference claim fails to allege an independently wrongful act.  (Della Penna v. Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc. (1995) 11 Cal. 4th 376, 393. The wrongful act must be more than just a breach of contract. (JRS Products, Inc. v. Matsushita Elec. Corp. of Am. (2004) 115 Cal. App. 4th 168.) Plaintiff argues that Defendant’s “failing to cure the warning messages despite being given ample opportunity to do so” (Complaint ¶ 41) constitutes a wrongful act, but the allegation describes nothing more than a potential breach of contract.

 

Second cause of action (defamation per se) SUSTAINED WITH LEAVE TO AMEND. The complaint alleges no defamatory statement. Paragraph 46 alleges statements “referenced above.” The reference is to allegations of a warning that a link “may be” malicious, to “follow care,” and “Remember, only follow links from sources you trust.” (Complaint ¶ 11.) None of these is a statement of fact that can be determined true or false. Defendant’s alternative argument that Plaintiff is a limited-purpose public figure does not necessarily follow,  based on the allegation that Plaintiff is a prolific filmmaker.

 

Third Cause of Action (breach of contract) SUSTAINED WITH LEAVE TO AMEND. The complaint references an attached copy of the agreement, but no exhibit is attached. The Complaint alleges that Facebook’s obligations were to “deliver Plaintiffs ads” and “deliver Plaintiff’s advertisements to their intended audiences.” (Complaint ¶¶ 54 & 55.) The complaint alleges breach as “failure to deliver the paid-for advertisements.” (Id. ¶ 57.) The complaint defines “advertisement” as a “web page link” in a drop-down menu for consumers to click on, which would lead to a subsequent web page about Plaintiff’s films. (Id. ¶ 17.) Combining paragraph 17 with paragraphs 54 and 55, the contractual obligation was for Facebook to “deliver” “an advertising web page link” to consumers.

 

Plaintiff complains not that the advertising links were not delivered, but that after consumers clicked on the link, they were shown warnings about possible malicious materials and were warned to proceed cautiously. (Id. ¶11.) Thus, the warnings appeared only after a consumer clicked on the link. Since the contract obligated Facebook to “deliver” “web page links,” and the warnings appeared only after consumers clicked on those links, the Complaint alleges that Facebook did “deliver” the web page links as the contract required. The Complaint does not allege that Facebook breached the contract.

 

On the issue of waiver, the Court concludes that the waiver provision is ambiguous about whether “transaction” applies only to payment or includes Defendant’s obligations to deliver ads. (Opposition at 5:26 – 6:9.)

 

Fourth cause of action (breach of implied covenant of good faith)  Overruled. Breach of an express contractual provision is not an element of the claim for breach of implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing.      Defendant relies on an incomplete quote from a federal district court case, that breach of the covenant will not apply “where there has been compliance with the contract’s express terms.” (Moving P&A at 10:8-13.) The complete quote sets forth two matters for finding no breach: “The implied covenant will not apply (1) where no express term exists on which to hinge an implied duty, and (2) where there has been compliance with the contract's express terms.” (Berger v. Home Depot U.S.A., Inc. (C. D. Cal 2007) 476 F. Supp. 2d 1174, 1177 [numbering added].)  Here, Plaintiff does allege that the implied covenant hinges upon an express term (i. e., to provide advertising links to Plaintiff’s film web pages). Since that allegation is present, the fact that Defendant complied with contract terms does not, by itself, defeat the claim.

 

The fourth cause of action alleges that Facebook tried to remedy the situation, but “persist[ed] rather than curing the errors following numerous notices” (Complaint ¶ 35), “failed to take remedial action” ( ¶ 40), and “failing to cure the warning messages” (¶ 41). Further, the complaint alleges that the affirmative act of causing the warning messages to be sent breached the implied covenant. (¶ 61.) The complaint sufficiently alleges deliberate action.

 

Fifth cause of action (negligence) SUSTAINED WITH LEAVE TO AMEND. Plaintiff’s opposition admits that Facebook’s duty of care was “pursuant to the SSAI [contract].”  (Opposition at 14:16-19.) Plaintiff is merely repeating his contract cause of action, alleging no general common law duty of care, other than by contract, owed by a social media provider to its advertisers.

 

The Court does not find that the Communications Decency Act necessarily precludes any cause of action.  Subdivision (c)(1) of Section 230 does not apply, since the complaint does not seek to hold Defendant liable for content provided by another information content provider. Subdivision (c)(2)(B) does not apply, because the Complaint does not allege liability based on action taken “to enabled or make available” access to objectionable material. Subdivision (c)(2)(A) on its face grants immunity for actions to restrict access to material. However, neither the statute nor any authority cited by Defendant suggests that the statute applies to a situation in which the interactive computer service entered into a contract to provide access to material, but then took actions to restrict access to that material. Under the allegations of the complaint, Section 230(c)(2)(A) does not provide immunity from any cause of action in the complaint.

 

Plaintiff is granted leave of court until May 16, 2016, to file and serve a First Amended Complaint addressing the deficiencies of the first, second, third, and fifth causes of action noted in this ruling.

 

If the tentative ruling is uncontested, it shall become the order of the court. Thereafter, moving party is directed to prepare a written order consistent with the Court’s ruling for the Court’s signature, pursuant to California Rules of Court, Rule 3.1312, and to provide notice thereof to the opposing party/counsel as required by law and the California Rules of Court. The order is to be submitted directly to Judge Susan Irene Etezadi, Department 18, for the Court’s signature.

 

_____________________________________________________________________


9:00

5

CIV 537381       SANTANDER CONSUMER USA, INC. VS. DENNIS C. LEMA

 

 

SANTANDER CONSUMER USA, INC.              MICHAEL R. ASATOURIAN

DENNIS C LEMA

 

 

HEARING FOR WRIT OF POSSESSION FILED BY SANTANDER CONSUMER USA, INC.

 

Plaintiff’s Application for a Writ of Possession is GRANTED as to defendants Sandra Lema and Dennis Lema pursuant to CCP §512.010. Plaintiff has established the probable validity of the claim through the Defendants’ default on the Note and Security Agreement. Plaintiff is not required to provide an undertaking because the amount which Defendants owe on the Note and Security Agreement exceeds the present value of the collateral.

 

If the tentative ruling is uncontested, it shall become the order of the court. Thereafter, moving party is directed to prepare a written order consistent with the Court’s ruling for the Court’s signature, pursuant to California Rules of Court, Rule 3.1312, and to provide notice thereof to the opposing party/counsel as required by law and the California Rules of Court. The order is to be submitted directly to Judge Susan Irene Etezadi, Department 18, for the Court’s signature.

 

_____________________________________________________________________


9:00

6

CLJ 524403       EDUCAP, INC. VS. JOANNA CURRY

 

 

EDUCAP, INC.                            RUDY GABA

JOANNA CURRY                             JULIANNA FREDMAN

 

 

MOTION TO QUASH SERVICE BY JOANNA CURRY

 

Defendant Joanna Curry’s unopposed Motion to Quash Service of the summons and complaint is GRANTED. Absent proper service of the summons and complaint, the court has no jurisdiction over a party who does not voluntarily appear. CCP §§415.10-415.45 Defendant has established through her declaration that she was never served with the summons and complaint in this matter.

If the tentative ruling is uncontested, it shall become the order of the court. Thereafter, moving party is directed to prepare a written order consistent with the Court’s ruling for the Court’s signature, pursuant to California Rules of Court, Rule 3.1312, and to provide notice thereof to the opposing party/counsel as required by law and the California Rules of Court. The order is to be submitted directly to Judge Susan Irene Etezadi, Department 18, for the Court’s signature.

 

_____________________________________________________________________


9:00

7

CLJ 535309       MIDLAND FUNDING LLC VS. KARIN HEYWOOD

 

 

MIDLAND FUNDING LLC                      JASON CHOU

KARIN HEYWOOD                            MARK A. RUIZ

 

 

MOTION FOR ORDER THAT MATTERS IN REQUEST FOR ADMISSION OF TRUTH OF FACTS BE ADMITTED BY MIDLAND FUNDING LLC

 

The unopposed Motion for Order Deeming Facts Admitted by Plaintiff Midland Funding, LLC is GRANTED pursuant to CCP § 2033.280. All of those matters set forth in Plaintiff’s Request for Admissions [Set One], dated October 29, 2015, are hereby deemed admitted.

 

If the tentative ruling is uncontested, it shall become the order of the court. Thereafter, moving party is directed to prepare a written order consistent with the Court’s ruling for the Court’s signature, pursuant to California Rules of Court, Rule 3.1312, and to provide notice thereof to the opposing party/counsel as required by law and the California Rules of Court. The order is to be submitted directly to Judge Susan Irene Etezadi, Department 18, for the Court’s signature.

 

_____________________________________________________________________


9:01

8

CIV 536869       CRAIG & KAREN NICHOLS VS. MICHAEL KERWIN, ET AL.

 

 

CRAIG NICHOLS                            ANDREW M. BAUGH

MICHAEL KERWIN                           PRO/PER

 

 

HEARING ON PETITION TO COMPEL PLAINTIFFS' COMPLIANCE WITH THE ARBITRATION PROVISION OF THE PURCHASE FILED BY MICHAEL KERWIN, ET AL.

 

Defendants Michael Kerwin and Amy Penticoff’s Petition to Compel Arbitration and to Stay Litigation Until Arbitration is Complete is GRANTED. Plaintiffs and Defendants Michael Kerwin and Amy Penticoff are ordered to attend binding arbitration, as provided for in the contract between the parties. The instant action in this Court is stayed until arbitration is completed.

There is a strong legislative policy favoring arbitration. A written agreement to arbitrate a controversy that arises from the conditions set forth in an agreement is valid, enforceable and irrevocable, upon grounds that exist for the revocation of any contract. CCP § 1281.

 

On a motion of a party to an arbitration agreement alleging the existence of a written agreement to arbitrate a controversy and that a party refuses to arbitrate the controversy, the court must order the petitioner and the respondent to arbitrate the controversy if it determines that an agreement to arbitrate the controversy exists. CCP § 1281.2.

 

CCP § 1281.2(c) permits the court to refuse to enforce the arbitration agreement when a "party to the arbitration agreement is also a party to a pending court action or special proceeding with a third party, arising out of the same transaction or series of related transactions and there is a possibility of conflicting rulings on a common issue of law or fact."

 

The third-party litigation exception of CCP § 1281.2(c) applies when (1) a party to the arbitration agreement is also a party to a pending court action or special proceeding with a third party; (2) the third-party action arises out of the same transaction or series of related transactions; and (3) there is a possibility of conflicting rulings on a common issue of law or fact. If all three of these conditions are satisfied, then § 1281.2(c) grants a trial court discretion to either deny or stay arbitration despite an agreement to arbitrate the dispute.  Acquire II, Ltd. v. Colton Real Estate Group (2013) 213 Cal. App. 4th 959, 967-968.

 

In this case, the Court does not have discretion to deny the defendants’ petition to compel arbitration because the Court does not find that the third-party action against the contractors arises out of the same transaction or series of related transactions as the claims against the defendants as sellers. The claim against defendants-sellers arises out of the sale of the house to plaintiffs, while the claims against the contractors arise out of construction work done to build or repair the house. These are two (or more) different transactions.

 

Secondly, the Court does not find a possibility of conflicting rulings on a common issue of law or fact in this case. The claims made against the defendants-sellers for failure to disclose information in a real estate transaction are different from the claims made against the contractor defendants for construction defects in the elements required, the standard of care or duty owed (if any), and the damages awardable. The duty to disclose in a real estate transaction generally requires the sellers to provide information on what is known about the condition of the property, while the construction defect claims require the contractors to do their work in accordance with standards of care in their industry. Water intrusion is the issue here; therefore the sellers’ duty to disclose what is known about where and when there was water intrusion is different from a roofer’s duty of care to provide satisfactory workmanship in installing roofing, for example. 

 

The allegations of the parties' pleadings may constitute substantial evidence sufficient to support a trial court's finding that § 1281.2(c) applies. Abaya v. Spanish Ranch I, L.P. (2010) 189 Cal. App. 4th 1490, 1498–1499.

 

A party relying on § 1281.2(c) to oppose a motion to compel arbitration does not bear an evidentiary burden to establish a likelihood of success or make any other showing regarding the viability of the claims and issues that create the possibility of conflicting rulings. Id. at 1498–1499. The question presented by § 1281.2(c) is whether a “‘possibility’” of conflicting rulings exists. Id. at 1499.

 

Plaintiffs must point to specific allegations in their complaint or other evidence in the record showing how separate transactions at separate times regarding the property  amount to a series of related transactions and how the claims regarding those separate transactions present the possibility of conflicting rulings on legal or factual issues common to the claims arising from those separate transactions. Acquire II, Ltd. v. Colton Real Estate Group (2013) 213 Cal. App. 4th 959, 974-975.

Plaintiffs are unable to bear this burden and explain how the construction work on the house is related to the defendant-sellers’ duty to disclose information about the property at the time of the sale.

In the case of Mastick v. TD Ameritrade, Inc. (2012) 209 Cal. App. 4th 1258, the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it found that enforcement of the agreement to arbitrate claims would create a risk of conflicting rulings because plaintiff’s claims against each defendant were based on a single injury arising from advice given at a single meeting concerning a single transaction. Mastick v. TD Ameritrade, Inc.  (2012) 209 Cal. App. 4th 1258, 1265.

Birl v. Heritage Care LLC involved third-party defendants not subject to the arbitration agreement, all of which admittedly were unrelated to the nursing facility seeking to compel arbitration.  Birl v. Heritage Care LLC (2009) 172 Cal. App. 4th 1313, 1319-1321.The appellate court affirmed the trial court's discretionary denial of arbitration under Code of Civil Procedure § 1281.2(c), concluding that the presence of the third-party hospital and nursing facilities invoked the provision and its other requirements were met because conflicting rulings could result against the different groups of defendants on issues such as apportionment of damages among the parties and other non-defendant health care providers based on their own separate care of the deceased patient. Id. at pp. 1319–1321.

In this case, there would be no apportionment of damages among the parties because apportionment of damages is for joint tortfeasors and in this case, the defendants are not joint tortfeasors, but independent because their duties to plaintiffs (if any) are different. 

The Court has reviewed the case cited by plaintiffs at oral argument, Krusi v. S.J. Amoroso Construction Co. (2000) 81 Cal. App. 4th 995 and found that it has no relevance to the case at bar. The question in Krusi was whether plaintiffs had standing to sue for construction defect if the defective work was done and/or damage sustained during the previous owner’s ownership. Krusi v. S.J. Amoroso Construction Co. (2000) 81 Cal. App. 4th 995, 998-999. There was no discussion of the sellers’ duty to disclose, or arbitration, in Krusi.

If the tentative ruling is uncontested, it shall become the order of the court. Thereafter, moving party is directed to prepare a written order consistent with the Court’s ruling for the Court’s signature, pursuant to California Rules of Court, Rule 3.1312, and to provide notice thereof to the opposing party/counsel as required by law and the California Rules of Court. The order is to be submitted directly to Judge Susan Irene Etezadi, Department 18, for the Court’s signature.

 

_____________________________________________________________________

 

 

 

 

 


POSTED:  3:00 PM

 

 

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