If an appearance is required or if a
party has provided timely notice of intent to appear, any party may appear
telephonically through Court Call. To do
so, you must contact Court Call at (888) 882-6878 no later than 4:30 p.m. on
the court day prior to the hearing.
In
the Superior Court of the State of
In
and for the
Law and Motion Calendar
Judge: Honorable GERALD J. BUCHWALD
Department 10
400 County Center, Courtroom
8D
JULY 27, 2010 |
If you plan to appear on
any case on this calendar,
you must call (650)
363-1882 before 4:00 p.m. and you must give notice also before 4:00 p.m. to
all parties of your intent to appear pursuant to
|
|
Case
Title / Nature of Case |
9:00
1
CIV 484517
PEOPLE OF THE STATE of
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE
OF
HOMELESS AND DISABLED
VETERANS ALLEN
WILSON
UNCONTESTED CALENDAR
REQUEST.
·
PROVE UP HEARING REQUIRED; NO TELEPHONIC APPEARANCES.
_____________________________________________________________________
9:00
2
CIV 493901 AUGUSTIN MENDEZ VS. EMC MORTGAGE
CORPORATION, ET AL.
AUGUSTIN
MENDEZ DAVID
J. WEINSOFF
EMC
MORTGAGE CORPORATION JOHN
M. SORICH
DEMURRER TO COMPLAINT of MENDEZ BY WELLS FARGO, J.P. CHASE
BANK, N.A.
·
OFF-CALENDAR.
Plaintiff having now filed a First Amended Complaint on July 20, 2010,
this Demurrer is now Moot and the matter is Ordered off-calendar.
_____________________________________________________________________
9:00
3
CIV 494180
WANDA O'DONNELL VS. SAN MATEO COUNTY TRANSIT DISTRICT, ET AL.
DENNIS
O'DONNELL DOLORES
VICTOR
SAN MATEO COUNTY TRANSIT
DISTRICT
MOTION TO STRIKE PORTIONS
OF COMPLAINT BY DEFENDANT FILED BY SAN MATEO COUNTY TRANSIT DISTRICT
·
If the tentative ruling is uncontested, it shall become the order
of the court, pursuant to Rule 3.1308(a)(1), adopted by Local Rule 3.10,
effective immediately, and no formal order pursuant to Rule 3.1312 or any other
notice is required, as the tentative ruling affords sufficient notice to the
parties.
____________________________________________________________________
9:00
4
CIV 494652 SAM R. GOODMAN VS. WASHINGTON MUTUAL BANK,
ET AL.
SAM
R. GOODMAN ROBERT
A. SPANNER
WASHINGTON MUTUAL BANK,
FA
DEMURRER TO COMPLAINT of GOODMAN BY J.P. MORGAN CHASE BANK,
N.A., AHMAD GHAVI
·
SUSTAINED, WITH LEAVE TO AMEND, AS TO CHASE BANK;
OVERRULED AS TO DEFENDANT AHMAD GHAVI.
·
Based on the allegations of the Complaint, Defendant
J.P. Morgan Chase Bank was not involved in the alleged initial loan or involved
in the alleged series of annual refinancing that were done by Washington Mutual
Bank (WAMU) prior to Chase Bank’s asset purchase of the failed WAMU in late
September 2008.
·
Furthermore, that asset acquisition did not involve
an assumption of any borrowers’ claims for damages or other relief arising out
of any WAMU loans made prior to late September 2008. In that regard, the Court
takes Judicial Notice of the Purchase and Assumption Agreement between Chase
Bank and the FDIC as requested. FDIC was appointed as receiver of WAMU on
September 25, 2008 when the Federal Office of Thrift Supervision closed
WAMU. Accordingly, FDIC’s relieving
Chase Bank of such claims as are made here is an official act of a Federal
agency that is proper to Judicially Notice under Evidence Code, Section 352
(b). (See, e.g., Love v. Superior Court (1990) 226 Cal. App.3d 736, at
743 footnote 5, wherein the Court took Judicial Notice of U.S. Department of
Public Health Service Guidelines for the fact that AIDS testing had been seen
to have a preventive aspect in the spread of the disease.)
·
As to Defendant Ghavi, the Complaint does not fail
for uncertainty. Nor does it fail to state causes of action for Breach of
Fiduciary Duty, Financial Elder Abuse, or Negligence. Based on the allegations,
it is clear that Defendant Ghavi was a trusted financial advisor of claimants
for more than 20 years, that they reposed great trust and confidence in him,
and that Ghavi was not just acting as a lender only, but stepped beyond that limited
role to take over substantial management functions as regards of the claimants’
personal financial affairs. Plaintiffs allege that they trusted and followed
Ghavi’s financial advice to their great detriment.
·
Further, the Complaint here sufficiently states the
basis for a Bus. & Prof. Code, Section 17200 claim. Claimants have alleged
the necessary standing based on injury in fact. They allege business practices
by Mr. Ghavi that, if true, offend all concepts of decent and honest business
competition; i.e., practices that are immoral, unethical, oppressive,
unscrupulous, and substantially injurious to consumers. The dishonest conduct,
over a very long period of time, here arguable was and is harmful to the
existence of fair competition in the marketplace. It is exactly that fair
competition itself that Section 17200 was adopted to protect.
·
Amended Pleadings, if any, as to Chase Bank to be
filed within 20 days of this Order. Defendant Ghavi to Answer the existing
Complaint as to him within 10 days of this Order.
·
If the tentative ruling is uncontested, it shall become the order
of the court, pursuant to Rule 3.1308(a)(1), adopted by Local Rule 3.10,
effective immediately, and no formal order pursuant to Rule 3.1312 or any other
notice is required, as the tentative ruling affords sufficient notice to the
parties.
_____________________________________________________________________
9:00
5
CIV 494710 LIONEL EMDE VS. CITY OF
LIONEL
EMDE ERIC
J. BENINK
CITY OF
DEMURRER TO COMPLAINT of EMDE BY CITY OF
·
OVERRULED.
·
The Complaint
alleges that
·
·
Proposition 218
precludes “any agency” from assessing any “tax, assessment, fee, or charge”
upon any “property or . . . any person as an incident of property ownership . .
. .”
·
The Complaint
also alleges that the increase is being assessed by
·
Finally, the
Complaint alleges that the services for which the rates are charged are
property-related and that they are imposed on parcels and persons as an
incident of property ownership. (Complaint ¶ 9.)
·
·
If the tentative ruling is uncontested, it shall become the order
of the court, pursuant to Rule 3.1308(a)(1), adopted by Local Rule 3.10,
effective immediately, and no formal order pursuant to Rule 3.1312 or any other
notice is required, as the tentative ruling affords sufficient notice to the
parties.
_____________________________________________________________________
9:00
6
CIV 494914 J.P. MORGAN CHASE BANK, NA. VS. JOSEPH S.
DEASER, ET AL.
J.P. MORGAN CHASE BANK,
NA. TIMOTHY
J. SILVERMAN
JOSEPH S. DEASER
APPLICATION FOR WRIT OF
POSSESSION BY J.P. MORGAN CHASE BANK, NA.
·
DENIED WITHOUT PREJUDICE. The Application for Writ of Possession is
Denied Without Prejudice for failure to properly serve the Defendant.
·
The proof of service is insufficient to support the conclusion
that Defendant Joseph Deaser was properly served with the Summons, Complaint,
Application for Writ of Possession and supporting documents. Under Code of
Civil Proc., § 415.20, a copy of the Summons, Complaint, and other documents,
may be left at the dwelling house or usual place of abode of the person to be
served if the documents cannot with reasonable diligence be personally
delivered to that person.
·
Although the allegations in the Complaint assert that Defendant
resides in
·
Furthermore, even if service was proper at Defendant’s supposed
residence in
·
If the tentative ruling is uncontested, it shall become the order
of the court, pursuant to Rule 3.1308(a)(1), adopted by Local Rule 3.10,
effective immediately, and no formal order pursuant to Rule 3.1312 or any other
notice is required, as the tentative ruling affords sufficient notice to the
parties.
_____________________________________________________________________
9:00
7
CLJ 482209 JONG S. HAN VS. KELLEY Y. GER
JONG S. HAN STEPHEN
BENDA
KELLEY Y. GER LINDA
L. MALLETTE
MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE
CROSS-COMPLAINT FILED BY KELLEY Y. GER
·
HEARING REQUIRED.
·
Movant’s counsel needs to clarify as to whether or
not, in fact, she is again actually acting as counsel of record herein.
Although Ms. Mallette’s Declaration filed July 19, 2010 refers to a recent
Substitution of Attorneys re-appointing her in the case, no such Substitution
is either attached to her Declaration or filed with the Court. The status of
the Court’s file is that she was relieved by Order filed June 4, 2010, and the
May 28, 2010 letter requesting that the Motion to withdraw go off-calendar was
not received by the Court.
·
If a proper Substitution reinstating Ms. Mallette as counsel of record
is filed by the time of Hearing, the Court is inclined to Grant the Motion. The
proposed cross-complaint is clearly a compulsory claim; it alleges that
Plaintiff Han overbilled for the
services that are the subject of his complaint. The only issues are (1) whether
Plaintiff Han would be unduly
prejudiced by allowing the cross-complaint and (2) whether Defendant Ger acted in good faith. Neither undue
prejudice nor bad faith is apparent here.
_____________________________________________________________________
9:00
8
CLJ 483599
AMERICAN EXPRESS TRAVEL RELATED SERVICES VS. DEBORAH SNEAD
AMERICAN EXPRESS TRAVEL
RELATED SERVICES ERICA L. BRACHFELD
DEBORAH SNEAD
MOTION FOR ORDER SETTING
ASIDE AND VACATING DEFAULT FILED BY AMERICAN EXPRESS TRAVEL RELATED SERVICES
·
GRANTED.
Although the Movant cannot have statutory relief at this point because
more than six months since entry of default and default judgment have run (See
CCP, Section 473 (b) ), the Court in the interests of justice, given that the
suing creditor is requesting the relief on the grounds that it made a mistake
in requesting a default be entered in the first place, will treat the Motion as
addressed to the Court’s inherent equitable power to set aside the default and
default judgment. (See Davis v. Thayer (1980) 113 Cal. App.3d 892, at
910.)
·
Movant’s counsel to prepare a form of Order vacating
default and default judgment and submit same to the Court.
·
If the tentative ruling is uncontested, it shall become the order
of the court, pursuant to Rule 3.1308(a)(1), adopted by Local Rule 3.10,
effective immediately, and no formal order pursuant to Rule 3.1312 or any other
notice is required, as the tentative ruling affords sufficient notice to the
parties.
_____________________________________________________________________
9:00
9
CLJ 486944 TARGET NATIONAL BANK VS. CARMEN GUZMAN
TARGET NATIONAL BANK MICHAEL
R. BOULANGER
CARMEN GUZMAN PRO/PER
MOTION FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT AS TO COMPLAINT of
TARGET NATIONAL BANK FILED BY TARGET NATIONAL BANK
·
GRANTED. Plaintiff’s
Motion for Summary Judgment is Granted. Plaintiff
has met its initial burden pursuant to CCP § 437c(p)(1) through the written
revolving credit agreement, the invoices and billing records, and the Declaration
of Ryan Flynn, their designated agent.
Defendants have not raised any triable issues of material fact in
response. Defendants have simply not
responded. Judgment for Plaintiff in the principal amount of $4,588.71 principal;
pre-judgment interest at 10% per annum from September 6, 2009 in the amount of
$275.32; and costs of $525.00.
·
Movant’s counsel to prepare and submit a form of
Order and form of Judgment to be submitted to the Court.
·
If the tentative ruling is uncontested, it shall become the order
of the court, pursuant to Rule 3.1308(a)(1), adopted by Local Rule 3.10,
effective immediately, and no formal order pursuant to Rule 3.1312 or any other
notice is required, as the tentative ruling affords sufficient notice to the
parties.
_____________________________________________________________________
9:00
10
CLJ 490129 CITIBANK (
CITIBANK (
ALEXANDER D. MILAN PRO/PER
MOTION FOR JUDGMENT ON
THE PLEADINGS FILED BY CITIBANK (
·
GRANTED. Plaintiff
CitiBank N.A.’s Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings is Granted. Defendant
·
Movant’s counsel to prepare a form of Order and form of Judgment to be
submitted to the Court.
·
If the tentative ruling is uncontested, it shall become the order
of the court, pursuant to Rule 3.1308(a)(1), adopted by Local Rule 3.10,
effective immediately, and no formal order pursuant to Rule 3.1312 or any other
notice is required, as the tentative ruling affords sufficient notice to the
parties.
_____________________________________________________________________
9:01
11
CIV 474977 LOIS BOYD VS.
LOIS
BOYD MARYLON
M. BOYD
MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE
THIRD AMENDED COMPLAINT FILED BY LOIS BOYD, MARYLON BOYD
·
HEARING REQUIRED PER THE COURT’S MINUTE ORDER OF JULY
15, 2010; NO TELEPHONIC APPEARANCES; MS BOYD TO BE PERSONALLY PRESENT.
MOTION TO STRIKE THIRD
AMENDED COMPLAINT FILED BY
·
HEARING REQUIRED PER THE COURT’S MINUTE ORDER OF JULY
15, 2010; NO TELEPHONIC APPEARANCES; MS BOYD TO BE PERSONALLY PRESENT.
DEMURRER TO THIrd Amended
COMPLAINT of BOYD BY
·
HEARING REQUIRED PER THE COURT’S MINUTE ORDER OF JULY
15, 2010; NO TELEPHONIC APPEARANCES; MS BOYD TO BE PERSONALLY PRESENT.
_____________________________________________________________________
9:01
12
CIV 485635 GRAY * DUFFY, LLC. VS. ALLIED FRAMERS, INC.
GRAY
* DUFFY, LLC. BARRY
D. BROWN
ALLIED
FRAMERS, INC. DAWN
CEIZLER
DEMURRER TO SECOnd Amended CROSS-COMPLAINT of
ALLIED FRAMERS, INC. BY GOLDEN BEAR INSURANCE COMPANY
·
FURTHER HEARING REQUIRED PER THE COURT’S ORDER OF
JULY 14, 2010. Counsel to further address: (1) How there can be any basis for
the bad faith claim here given that the Defendant excess carrier has paid its
entire policy limits in settlement of the underlying case? (2) Why, in any
event, the Court should not strike the punitive damages prayer based on the
arguably obvious lack of malice, fraud, or oppression reflected in the
Defendant excess carrier’s payment of its entire policy limits in settlement of
the underlying case?
_____________________________________________________________________
9:01
13
CLJ 201917 WILLIAM R. SINGLETON VS. HEATHER CURRY, ET
AL.
WILLIAM
R. SINGLETON PRO/PER
HEATHER CURRY
MOTION TO QUASH SERVICE
OF SUMMONS FILED BY HEATHER CURRY
·
DENIED WITHOUT PREJUDICE. Defendants Heather Curry’s Motion to Quash is
Denied Without Prejudice for lack of proper service. Eight days’ notice was
required. The motion to quash must be set for hearing on not less than three
days notice pursuant to CCP §418.10(a) and Local Rule 3.15(b). With a minimum of 3 day’s notice, plus 5
additional days for mailing, pursuant to CCP §1005, the earliest date this
motion could be heard is July 28, 2010.
Further, defendant is seeking to quash service that has never been
effected. No substantive grounds have
been stated for the Motion to Quash.
·
If the tentative ruling is uncontested, it shall become the order
of the court, pursuant to Rule 3.1308(a)(1), adopted by Local Rule 3.10,
effective immediately, and no formal order pursuant to Rule 3.1312 or any other
notice is required, as the tentative ruling affords sufficient notice to the parties.
_____________________________________________________________________
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If an appearance is required or if a
party has provided timely notice of intent to appear, any party may appear
telephonically through Court Call. To do
so, you must contact Court Call at (888) 882-6878 no later than 4:30 p.m. on
the court day prior to the hearing.
In
the Superior Court of the State of
In
and for the
Presiding Judge - Law
and Motion Calendar
Judge: Honorable Stephen m. hall
Department 24
400 County Center, Courtroom
2C
JULY 27, 2010 |
If you plan to appear on
any case on this calendar,
you must call (650)
363-4812 before 4:00 p.m. and you must give notice also before 4:00 p.m. to
all parties of your intent to appear pursuant to
|
|
Case Title
/ Nature of Case |
9:00
1
CIV 476398 KEMBCON CORPORATION VS. OMAR ALZGOUL
KEMBCON
CORPORATION CATHLEEN
M. CURL
OMAR
ALZGOUL J.
EDWARD KERLEY
RELIEF FROM WAIVER OF
JURY TRIAL
·
Motion for Relief from Waiver of Jury Trial is
granted.
·
Defendant Alzgoul's demand for jury trial has been
set forth in the record since at least July 2009. Defendant Alzgoul's counsel posted jury fees,
albeit some days late, in February 2010 for the former March 1, 2010
trial. The March 1st trial was reset to
June 1, 2010.
·
On June 2, 2010, all parties announced ready and the
matter was assigned to Judge Julie Conger for jury trial. The issue of late deposit of jury fees was
first raised with Judge Conger and it was left for her to decide if the matter
would proceed by way of jury trial or court trial. It was then determined that the parties were
not ready for trial and Judge Conger referred the matter the matter back and it
was put over to set a new trial date.
·
The current jury trial is scheduled for October 12,
2010. A judge should always resolve any
doubts in favor of allowing a jury trial (Wharton v Superior Court
(1991) 231 Cal.3d 100). This is not the
type of situation by way of the cases cited by the opposing parties in which
trial courts denied relief from jury waiver when they occurred 5 days or less
prior to trial. Given this factual
setting, this Court believes the failure to grant said motion would constitute
an abuse of discretion.
_____________________________________________________________________
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