October 20, 2014
Law & Motions Tentative Rulings
  • Law and Motion Department Tentative Ruling Line:  (650) 261-5019
  • Other Judges' tentatives: please reference the appropriate Case Number and Case Caption below and contact the appropriate department.

Telephonic Appearances (CourtCall): If an appearance is required or if a party has provided timely notice of intent to appear by 4:00 p.m. to the court and all parties, any party may appear telephonically through CourtCall. To do so, you must contact CourtCall at (888) 882-6878 no later than 4:30 p.m. on the court day prior to the hearing. Notifying CourtCall with your intent to appear is not an alternative to notifying the court. Please visit their website for more information. Please also see California Rule of Court No. 3.670.

In the Superior Court of the State of California

In and for the County of San Mateo

 

Law and Motion Calendar

Judge: Honorable ELIZABETH K. LEE

Department 17

 

400 County Center, Redwood City

Courtroom 2M

 

OCTOBER 21, 2014

 

IF YOU INTEND TO APPEAR ON ANY CASE ON THIS CALENDAR YOU MUST DO THE FOLLOWING:

1. YOU MUST CALL (650) 261-5019 BEFORE 4:00 P.M. TO INFORM THE COURT OF YOUR INTENT TO APPEAR.

2. You must give notice before 4:00 P.M. to all parties of your intent to appear pursuant to California Rules of Court 3.1308(a)(1).

 

Failure to do both items 1 and 2 will result in no oral presentation.

 

N.B. Notifying CourtCall with your intent to appear is not an alternative to notifying the court.  

 

All Counsel are reminded to comply with California Rule of Court 3.1110.  The Court will expect all exhibits to be tabbed accordingly. 

 

    Case                  Title / Nature of Case

9:00

1

CIV 518611       DIRA INVESTMENTS, INC. VS. STEPHEN RIVERA, ET AL.

 

 

DIRA INVESTMENTS, INC.                MAC E. NEHORAY

STEPHEN RIVERA

 

 

MOTION FOR ORDER COMPELLING ATTENDANCE AND TESTIMONY OF DEPONENT YOUSEF BUKHARI AND PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS DESCRIBED IN DEPOSITION NOTICE AND REQUEST FOR MONETARY SANCTIONS BY PRIVATE CAPITAL FUND, LLC AND STONECREST MANAGERS, INC.

 

 

MOTION FOR ORDER COMPELLING ATTENDANCE AND TESTIMONY OF DEPONENT AHMAD NOUREDINE, AKA MIKE NOUREDINE, AND PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS DESCRIBED IN DEPOSITION NOTICE AND REQUEST FOR MONETARY SANCTIONS BY PRIVATE CAPITAL FUND, LLC AND STONECREST MANAGERS, INC.

 

 

·         Defendants’ unopposed Motions to Compel the Attendance and Testimony of Deponents Ahmad Nouredine aka Mike Nouredine and Yousef Bukhari are GRANTED in part and DENIED in part.

 

·         The Motions are GRANTED in that said deponents are ordered to appear and give testimony at their depositions to be held at the office of Belzer & Murray LLP in Lafayette, California.  The depositions shall be at the mutual convenience of the parties.  Deponents are ordered to provide Defendants with at least five dates of their availability for depositions in November 2014; these dates shall be provided in writing on or before Oct. 28, 2014.

 

·         The Motions are DENIED with respect to the request for production of documents at the deposition because moving Defendants failed to set forth facts showing good cause justifying the production of the requested documents.  (See CCP section 2025.450(b)(1)).

 

·         Ahmad Nouredine aka Mike Nouredine is ordered to pay Private Capital Fund and Stonecrest Managers the sum of $2,911.00 as and for monetary sanctions on or before Nov. 7, 2014.

 

·         Yousef Bukhari is ordered to pay Private Capital Fund and Stonecrest Managers the sum of $2,911.00 as and for monetary sanctions on or before Nov. 7, 2014.

 

·         Moving party is directed to prepare a written order consistent with the Court’s ruling for the Court’s signature, pursuant to California Rules of Court, Rule 3.1312, and provide notice thereof to the opposing party/counsel as required by law and the California Rules of Court.  The order is to be submitted directly to Judge Elizabeth K. Lee, Department 17.

 

 

_____________________________________________________________________

 

9:00

2

CIV 526072       NBSK ESTATE CORPORATION VS. AVIRA, INC.

 

 

NBSK ESTATE CORPORATION               PAUL T. LLEWELLYN

AVIRA, INC.                           CHRISTOPHER J. BORDERS

 

 

MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT/SUMMARY ADJUDICATION OF ISSUES BY

AVIRA, INC. AGAINST NBSK ESTATE CORPORATION AND NOAH KINDLER

 

 

·         Plaintiff’s objections are sustained: 2, 7, 9, 10, 12, 13, 32, 33, 34, 35, 37, 39, 40, 43, 48, 49, 50, 51, and 52.  All other objections are overruled.

 

·         The motion for summary judgment is denied.

 

·         The motion for summary adjudication is denied as to each cause of action and issue.

 

·         As to the 1st cause of action (fraud): Material Facts 10, 11, and 13 are disputed.  A triable issue exists about whether SocialShield was in imminent danger of shutting down, and therefore, whether Plaintiff Kindler relied on the alleged misrepresentations.  Even if facts 10 through 18 were all undisputed, they do not compel the conclusion that Plaintiff Kindler had no choice but to accept Defendant Avira’s buyout offer.  Therefore, the facts do not demonstrate that Plaintiff Kindler placed no reliance on Defendant Avira’s misrepresentations.  Defendant Avira’s alternative argument, that the alleged promises were “ill-defined, amorphous, incapable of concrete evaluation and cannot provide the basis for the fraud claims” lacks merit.  None of the Material Facts cited (Facts 39-51) demonstrate that the first misrepresentation (36 months’ salary) was not made.  Defendant’s motion is on the grounds that (1) “the alleged misrepresentations are not actionable” and (2) “there is no evidence of an intention to defraud plaintiff”.  (See Notice of Motion at 2:1-5.)  The motion fails to demonstrate that either fact is undisputed.

·         As to the 2nd cause of action (negligent misrepresentation): The Issue as to the 2nd cause of action is that “the alleged misrepresentations are not actionable in a cause of action for negligent misrepresentation.”  (Notice of Motion at 2:6-10.)  The alleged misrepresentations are set forth in paragraph 71 of the First Amended Complaint.  The Moving Points and Authorities contain no argument that the misrepresentation are “not actionable,” as the Notice of Motion informs.  Instead, the Moving Points and Authorities argue that (1) Plaintiff “cannot prove” that the representations were false and (2) “Kindler has no evidence” to prove that Avira intended to expand the business.  (Moving P&A at 9:5-18.) 

 

·         A party moving for summary judgment may not merely state that the plaintiff has no evidence.  The summary judgment statute requires a “need for concrete evidence from the moving party and expressly requires the moving party to supply more than the bare assertion, whether alleged in a pleading or by way of argument, that the opposing party has no evidence to support a particular claim.”  (Scheiding v. Dinwiddie Const. Co. (1999) 69 Cal.App.4th 64, 75-76.)  A defendant must present evidence that the plaintiff “does not possess and cannot reasonably obtain, needed evidence.”  (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 854.)  Such evidence usually consists of admissions by plaintiff following extensive discovery to the effect that he or she has discovered nothing to support an essential element of the cause of action.  (Id. at 855; Union Bank v. Superior Court (Demetry) (1995) 31 Cal.App.4th 573, 590.)  Defendant Avira’s motion offers no such showing.

 

·         Regardless, even if it were undisputed that Plaintiff could not prove that misrepresentations (b) through (d) were false, the motion fails to even suggest that Plaintiff “cannot prove” misrepresentation (a) [36 months’ salary].  For that reason, the motion fails to dispose of the entire cause of action and must be denied.

 

·         As to the 3rd cause of action (breach of oral contract): The ground for attacking the 3rd cause of action is that it is barred by the parol evidence rule. (Notice of Motion at 2:11-15.)  Under Code of Civil Procedure section 1856, the “terms included therein” means the terms included in the March 2012 offer letter.  In that letter, the “subject matter hereto” is Plaintiff Kindler’s employment.  In contrast, the allegations concerning the promise of 36 months’ salary have nothing to do with his employment.  They relate to his promise to help Defendant Avira affect the buyout of SocialShield, not his working for Avira.  (See FAC ¶¶ 5 & 6 [promise was to “induce Mr. Kindler to sell SocialShield”]; 29 [payment was “in exchange” for Plaintiff “to support the Avira acquisition . . . and lobby for its approval”]; 38 [Defendant’s commitments “were sufficient to make Avira’s offer personally compelling”].)

 

·         Specifically, the 3rd cause of action expressly states that the promise of 36 months’ payment was “in exchange for his support of the Avira acquisition.”  (FAC ¶ 79.)  Plaintiff Kindler testifies that the promise was for his assisting and backing Avira’s buyout, not for his employment.  (See Declaration of Kindler ¶¶ 6 & 7.)  Therefore, at a minimum, a triable issue of fact exists about whether the promise to pay 36 months’ salary pertained to Plaintiff’s employment, or if it was part of an agreement separate from the March 2012 Offer Letter.

 

·         As to the 4th cause of action (promissory estoppel): Promissory estoppel is an alternative theory by which to enforce a promise when no consideration is given.  The motion fails to demonstrate that valid consideration was given for Defendant’s promise of 36 months’ pay.  The motion fails to establish a lack of consideration, instead merely asserting that the Complaint alleges gave valid consideration.  (Moving P&A at 17:25 - 18:3.)  The existence of allegations that consideration was given does not prove that consideration was given. Defendant Avira relies on two cases that are inapposite.  In Money Store Inv Corp v S. Cal Bank (2002) 98 Cal. App 4th 722, 732, evidence on summary judgment proved the existence of a contract (and consideration), so dismissing promissory estoppel was justified.  In Fontenot v Wells Fargo Bank, NA (2011) 198 Cal.App.4th 256, 275- 76, the existence of a contract was admitted by all parties (copy of contract was attached to complaint), which justified denying claim for promissory estoppel.  Here, Defendant Avira offers no evidence that Plaintiff Kindler gave consideration in exchange for the promise of 36 months’ salary.

 

·         As to the 5th cause of action: The ground for the motion is that the parol evidence rule bars the claim.  (Notice of Motion at 2:20-24.)  As set forth above, the parol evidence rule does not apply, since the two agreements were distinct.  As to the constructive discharge portion of the 5th cause of action, the motion offers no evidence to negate any element of the claim.  (See Moving P&A at 18:4 – 19:16; see Turner v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 1238, 1251 [setting forth elements of constructive discharge].)

 

·         As to the 6th cause of action (implied covenant): Defendant Avira’s only argument is that since no oral agreement existed, there can be no implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing.  The motion fails as to the 6th cause of action because the motion fails to demonstrate that no oral agreement existed.

 

·         As to the 7th cause of action (Bus. & Prof. § 17200): Defendant argues that Plaintiff’s inability to prove fraud prevents him from proving that Defendant Avira engaged in fraudulent business practices.  As set forth above, the motion fails to demonstrate that the fraud causes of action (1st and 2nd causes of action) lack merit.  Therefore, Defendant Avira fails to demonstrate that Plaintiff Kindler cannot establish fraud.  Defendant Avira’s argues that Plaintiff cannot prove “unlawful” business practice (violation of Labor Code) because the parol evidence rule precludes recovery of the 36 months’ salary.  As set forth above, the parol evidence rule does not defeat the claim for 36 months’ salary.

 

·         As to the 8th cause of action (unjust enrichment): The argument that Plaintiff Kindler cannot prove the existence of a contract is based on the contention that the parol evidence rule bars evidence of the 36 months’ salary promise.  As explained above, this argument lacks merit.  The argument that Plaintiff Kindler “cannot prove fraudulent intent as a basis for his fraud-based claims” is based on the same argument and also fails for the same reasons.

 

·         As to punitive damages: Defendant argues that There is simply no evidence to prove that Avira committed any tort” and Kindler has no "clear and convincing" evidence of such.”  (Moving P&A at 20:10-18.)  Defendant Avira fails to produce any evidence to support this argument.  To establish “no evidence” of a claim, the defendant must present evidence that the plaintiff “does not possess and cannot reasonably obtain, needed evidence.”  (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 854.)  Defendant Avira’s motion fails to meet this burden.

 

·         Moving party is directed to prepare a written order consistent with the Court’s ruling for the Court’s signature, pursuant to California Rules of Court, Rule 3.1312, and provide notice thereof to the opposing party/counsel as required by law and the California Rules of Court.  The order is to be submitted directly to Judge Elizabeth K. Lee, Department 17.

 

 

_____________________________________________________________________

 

9:00

3

CIV 526636       JOHN E. O'ROURKE, ET AL. VS. GARY CHRISTENSEN

 

 

JOHN E. O'ROURKE                      EDWARD W. SUMAN

GARY CHRISTENSEN                      DAVID S. ROSENBAUM

 

 

MOTION TO SET ASIDE DEFAULT BY GARY CHRISTENSEN DBA WEST COAST CORVETTE

 

 

·         Defendant’s Motion to Set Aside Default pursuant to CCP § 473(b) is GRANTED.  Defendant’s failure to respond to the complaint was due to excusable neglect and Defendant has been diligent in his attempts to remove this default and resolve this dispute since learning of the default.  Elston v. City of Turlock (1985) 38 Cal.3d 227, 233; Luz v. Lopes (1960) 55 Cal.2d. 54, 62. 

·         Moving party is directed to prepare a written order consistent with the Court’s ruling for the Court’s signature, pursuant to California Rules of Court, Rule 3.1312, and provide notice thereof to the opposing party/counsel as required by law and the California Rules of Court.  The order is to be submitted directly to Judge Elizabeth K. Lee, Department 17.

 

 

_____________________________________________________________________

 

9:00

4

CIV 527001       SAMIE T. BACORRO VS. COUNTRYWIDE BANK FSB, ET AL.

 

 

SAMIE T. BACORRO                      NICOLAS J. GOMEZ

BANK OF AMERICA, N.A.                 MOLLY TAYLOR ZAPALA

 

 

DEMURRER TO COMPLAINT of BACORRO BY BANK OF AMERICA, N.A., COUNTRYWIDE HOME LOANS, INC., THE BANK OF NEW YORK MELLON FKA THE BANK OF NEW YORK AND MORTGAGE ELECTRONIC REGISTRATION SYSTEMS, INC.

 

 

·         This matter is continued to November 19, 2014 at 9:00 a.m.

 

 

_____________________________________________________________________

 

9:00

5

CIV 528621       TANIA SOLE VS. CITY OF REDWOOD CITY, ET AL.

 

 

TANIA SOLE                            PRO/PER

CITY OF REDWOOD CITY                  KEVIN D. SIEGEL

 

 

DEMURRER TO PETITION of SOLE BY CITY OF REDWOOD CITY

 

 

·         Respondent/Defendant CITY OF REDWOOD CITY’s (CITY) Demurrer to Petition/Complaint is SUSTAINED WITHOUT LEAVE TO AMEND in its entirety, as follows:

 

·         As to the First cause of action for petition for writ of mandate, on the ground that Petitioner/Plaintiff TANIA SOLE has not demonstrated that the CITY owed a ministerial duty, in obedience to any legal authority, to permit a sewer connection for her houseboat.  U.S. Ecology v. State (2001) 92 Cal.App.4th 113, 138.  Petitioner further fails to demonstrate that the CITY’s actions in denying a permit were “arbitrary, capricious or entirely lacking in evidentiary support” to be entitled to a writ under Code Civ. Proc. § 1085.  Sacks v. City of Oakland (2010) 190 Cal.App.4th 1070, 1082.

 

·         Chapter 27, Article VI of the Municipal Code does not set forth a definition for “structure”.  The Court finds that the CITY’s interpretation of “structure” as set forth in various other sections of the Municipal Code as well as the Zoning Code, as referring to ground-based structures, is the correct interpretation.  Where a petitioner and local agency differ in their interpretations, the Court must defer to the local agency’s reasonable interpretation of its own law unless “clearly erroneous or unauthorized”.  Friends of Davis v. City of Davis (2000) 83 Cal.App.4th 1004, 1015.  Since a houseboat, not being a ground-based structure, is not included in the CITY’s definition of “structure”, Section 27.51 does not apply. 

 

·         Thus, SOLE has not established that the CITY owed her a duty to permit a sewer connection pursuant to any applicable laws.  While there is passing reference to the Clean Water Act in her Petition, the CWA imposes no duty on the CITY to permit her sewer connection, and SOLE makes no argument with respect to this statute in her opposition. 

 

·         SOLE’s other option is to demonstrate that the CITY had discretion in determining whether to grant her a permit, and that its actions in denying a permit was “arbitrary, capricious or entirely lacking in evidentiary support” to be entitled to a writ under Code Civ. Proc. § 1085.  Sacks v. City of Oakland (2010) 190 Cal.App.4th 1070, 1082.  However, as demonstrated in the correspondence attached as Exhibit B to the Petition, the CITY engaged in extensive efforts to dialogue with SOLE about her illegal connection and why it needed to be removed, the most important being that the CITY had limited access to the lateral sewer, and that her connection was causing a dangerous strain that could lead to rupture. 

 

·         SOLE contends that she should be entitled to a sewer connection permit because four other residents of Docktown Marina have been able to connect.  This contention is without merit.  The four sewer connections existed before the CITY took over management of Docktown Marina, and were thus grandfathered in.  This does not automatically entitled SOLE to a connection as well.  Fischbach & Moore, Inc. v. State Board of Equalization (1981) 117 Cal.App.3d 627, 632.  The CITY appropriately informed SOLE that the pre-existing sewer connections do not entitle everyone else in the marina to connect at that same lateral sewer, which would lead to extreme stress and strain on the pipes.  As SOLE is unable to demonstrate that the CITY acted in an arbitrary, capricious manner, or that its actions lack evidentiary support, her petition for writ of mandate fails.

 

·         As to the Second cause of action for declaratory relief, on the ground that Petitioner’s exclusive remedy in challenging an administrative decision is her petition for writ of mandate.  Tejon Real Estate, LLC v. City of Los Angeles (2014) 223 Cal.App.4th 149, 152-53.  Since her writ claim fails, her cause of action for declaratory relief must also fail.  Golden Gate Water Ski Club v. County of Contra Costa (2008) 165 Cal.App.4th 249, 266. 

 

·         As to the Third cause of action for due process violations, on the ground that Petitioner has not demonstrated that the CITY denied her any property interest.  Even if such an interest were established, however, her Petition shows that neither procedural nor substantive due process violations occurred.  Petitioner was given ample notice of the unpermitted sewer connection and opportunity to respond, and thus no procedural due process violations occurred.  Perez v. City of San Bruno (1980) 27 Cal.3d 875, 894-95.  Further, as evidenced by the extensive communications between Petitioner and the CITY, attached as Exhibit “B” to the Petition, the CITY provided reasonable explanations for why the sewer connection needed to be removed.  Petitioner thus does not demonstrate any substantive due process violations, as there is no “abuse of governmental power that shocks the conscience” or that lacks any arguably legitimate rationale.  Kawaoka v. City of Arroyo Grande (9th Cir. 1994) 17 F.3d 1227, 1234. 

 

·         As to the Fourth cause of action for injunctive relief, as a claim for injunctive relief is not an independent cause of action.  City of Tiburon v. Northwestern Pac. R.R. Co. (1970) 4 Cal.App.3d 1160, 178.  As Petitioner is unable to state a viable cause of action, this claim necessarily fails. 

 

·         As Petitioner has not met her burden of demonstrating that her petition is capable of amendment, leave to amend is denied.  Washington v. County of Contra Costa (1995) 38 Cal.App.4th 890.

 

·         The CITY’s Request for Judicial Notice and Supplemental Request for Judicial Notice are GRANTED pursuant to Evidence Code § 452.  The CITY’s evidentiary objection to the entirety of Petitioner’s Declaration is SUSTAINED.  On a demurrer, declarations or other offers of evidence shall not be considered with respect to whether a complaint states a cause of action.  Allred v. Bekins Wide World Van Services (1975) 45 Cal.App.3d 984, 993. 

 

·         Moving party is directed to prepare a written order consistent with the Court’s ruling for the Court’s signature, pursuant to California Rules of Court, Rule 3.1312, and provide notice thereof to the opposing party/counsel as required by law and the California Rules of Court.  The order is to be submitted directly to Judge Elizabeth K. Lee, Department 17.

 

 

_____________________________________________________________________

 

9:00

6

CIV 529561       JONATHAN M. HOFFMAN VS. VALERIE HOFFMAN

 

 

JONATHAN M. HOFFMAN                   ISAAC DELEON GOODMAN

VALERIE HOFFMAN                       DAVID B. FISHER

 

 

MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE AMENDED COMPLAINT BY JONATHAN M. HOFFMAN

 

 

·         Plaintiff’s unopposed Motion for Leave to File Amended Complaint is GRANTED pursuant to CCP § 473(a).  “The policy favoring amendment is so strong that it is a rare case in which denial of leave to amend can be justified.”  Howard v. County of San Diego (2010) 184 Cal.App.4th 1422, 1428.  The initial complaint was filed only a few months ago and no trial date has been set.  Further, the amended complaint simply deletes the cause of action for ejectment and adds information regarding events occurring after the filing of the initial complaint. 

 

·         Moving party is directed to prepare a written order consistent with the Court’s ruling for the Court’s signature, pursuant to California Rules of Court, Rule 3.1312, and provide notice thereof to the opposing party/counsel as required by law and the California Rules of Court.  The order is to be submitted directly to Judge Elizabeth K. Lee, Department 17.

 

 

_____________________________________________________________________

 

9:00

7

CIV 530030       RITA TORRES CRUZ VS. ALFREDO BETENCOURT TORRES

 

 

RITA TORRES CRUZ                      ANNE M. SIDWELL

ALFREDO BETENCOURT TORRES             PRO/PER

 

 

MOTION TO SEAL RECORD TO PROTECT LITIGANT'S CONFIDENTIAL PERSONAL INFORMATION BY RITA SANCHEZ CRUZ

 

 

·         The motion is denied without prejudice for lack of a filed proof of service. No opposition was filed.  The court also notes that the request to seal is not narrowly tailored as required by California Rules of Court §2.550 and thus would normally be denied on the merits on these grounds.

 

·         If the tentative ruling is uncontested, it shall become the order of the Court, pursuant to Rule 3.1308(a)(1), adopted by Local Rule 3.10, effective immediately, and no formal order pursuant to Rule 3.1312 or any other notice is required, as the tentative ruling affords sufficient notice to the parties. 

 

 

_____________________________________________________________________

 

9:00

8

CLJ 209779       MARIA SOSA vs. NATHANIEL BASOLA SOBAYO, et al.

 

 

MARIA SOSA                            STEVE LEYDIKER

NATHANIEL BASOLA SOBAYO               PRO/PER

 

 

MOTION TO STRIKE PLAINTIFF'S REQUEST FOR ENTRY OF DEFAULT AND THE ILLEGAL UNLAWFUL DETAINER COMPLAINT BY NATHANIEL BASOLA SOBAYO DBA KINGSWAY CAPITAL PARTNERS, LLC

 

 

·         The court notes that Defendant’s motion to strike is procedurally defective: it exceeds the 15-page limit set forth in CRC 3.1113(d) and the memorandum of points and authorities makes motions that were not identified in the notice.  As Defendant only gave notice of a motion to strike the request for entry of default and complaint, that is the only portion of the motion that the court will consider.

 

·         Defendant’s motion to strike is denied on the ground it is untimely.  Notice of a motion to strike must be given “within the time allowed to respond to a pleading” (CCP §435(b)(1), CRC 3.1322(b)) “and if a demurrer is interposed, concurrently therewith, and must be noticed for hearing and heard at the same time as the demurrer." CRC 3.1322(b).  The time within which a defendant must respond to an unlawful detainer complaint "shall not exceed 5 days."  §1167.3.  There is a POS in the file showing that the summons and complaint were personally served on 7/9/14.  Defendant filed a demurrer on 7/11/14.  Thus, the current motion to strike, filed on 10/3/14, is untimely.

 

·         Nor is there any authority for a motion to strike a request for entry of default. §435(b)(1) authorizes a motion to strike the whole/part of "a pleading".  “The term ‘pleading’ means a demurrer, answer, complaint, or cross-complaint.” CCP §435(a)(2). 

 

·         The gist of defendant's motion to strike the complaint is that it fails to state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action as plaintiff lacks standing.  These are grounds for a demurrer, not a motion to strike.  The hearing on Defendant's previously filed demurrer is set for 11/6/14.

 

·         Moving attorney is directed to prepare a written order consistent with the Court’s ruling for the Court’s signature, pursuant to California Rules of Court, Rule 3.1312, and to provide notice thereof to the opposing party/counsel as required by law and the California Rules of Court. The order is to be submitted directly to Judge Joseph C. Scott, Department 25.

 

 

_____________________________________________________________________

 

9:00

9

CLJ 210068       ANGELA LOWE VS. STEVE HOSKINS, ET AL.

 

 

ANGELA LOWE                           PRO/PER

STEVE HOSKINS                         PRO/PER

 

 

DEMURRER TO COMPLAINT (UNLAWFUL DETAINER) of LOWE BY STEVEN HOSKINS AND ANNETTE HOSKINS

 

 

·         This matter is moot.  On October 9, 2014, moving party Steve Hoskins and Annette Hoskins have withdrawn the demurrer.

 

 

_____________________________________________________________________

 

9:00

10

CLJ 518607       UNIFUND CCR, LLC VS. FARSHIDEH ZAKERI

 

 

UNIFUND CCR, LLC                      KENNETH J. MIELE

FARSHIDEH ZAKERI

 

 

MOTION TO SET ASIDE JUDGMENT, QUASH WAGE GARNISHMENT ORDER AND RETURN OF ALL GARNISHED FUNDS BY FARSHIDEH ZAKERI

 

 

·         At the request of the moving party, defendant Zakeri, this matter has been taken off the calendar.

 

 

_____________________________________________________________________

 

© 2014 Superior Court of San Mateo County