March 30, 2017
Law & Motion Department Tentative Rulings
  • Law and Motion Department Tentative Ruling Line:  (650) 261-5019
  • Other Judges' tentatives: please reference the appropriate Case Number and Case Caption below and contact the appropriate department.

Telephonic Appearances (CourtCall): If an appearance is required or if a party has provided timely notice of intent to appear by 4:00 p.m. to the court and all parties, any party may appear telephonically through CourtCall. To do so, you must contact CourtCall at (888) 882-6878 no later than 4:30 p.m. on the court day prior to the hearing. Notifying CourtCall with your intent to appear is not an alternative to notifying the court. Please visit their website for more information. Please also see California Rule of Court No. 3.670.

 

In the Superior Court of the State of California

In and for the County of San Mateo

 

Law and Motion Calendar

Judge: Honorable john l. grandsaert

Department 11

 

400 County Center, Redwood City

Courtroom 2D

 

Thursday, March 30, 2017

 

NOTICE TO ALL COUNSEL

 

Until further order of the Court, no endorsed-filed “courtesy copy” of pleadings is required to be provided to the Law and Motion Department.

 

 

IF YOU INTEND TO APPEAR ON ANY CASE ON THIS CALENDAR YOU MUST DO THE FOLLOWING:

 

1. YOU MUST CALL (650) 261-5019 BEFORE 4:00 P.M. TO INFORM THE COURT OF YOUR INTENT TO APPEAR.

2. You must give notice before 4:00 P.M. to all parties of your intent to appear pursuant to California Rules of Court 3.1308(a)(1).

 

Failure to do both items 1 and 2 will result in no oral presentation.

 

Notifying CourtCall with your intent to appear is not an alternative to notifying the court.

 

All Counsel are reminded to comply with California Rule of Court 3.1110.  The Court will expect all exhibits to be tabbed accordingly. 

 

    Case                  Title / Nature of Case

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

9:00

Line: 1

16-CIV-00242     FARIS FYZEE VS. ALEX PERES, ET AL.

 

 

FARIS FYZEE                            Pro/PER

ALEX PERES                                  

 

 

DEMURRER TO PLAINTIFF’S FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT BY KAMELIYA VLADIMIROVA

TENTATIVE RULING:

 

The hearing on Defendant Kameliya Vladimirova’s Demurrer to Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint (“FAC”) is continued to April 19th at 9 a.m. in the Law & Motion Department, in part so that it can be heard together with Defendant Vladimirova’s pending Special Motion to Strike pursuant to Code Civ. Proc. § 425.16, and in part because the parties have not properly met and conferred regarding the present Demurrer.  Code Civ. Proc. § 430.41 requires an attempt to speak, either in-person or on the telephone, with the party who filed the pleading subject to the Demurrer in an attempt to resolve the issues raised in the Demurrer.  Here, the parties spoke regarding Plaintiff’s initial Complaint, but Plaintiff then filed a FAC.  When an amended Complaint is filed, the parties must meet and confer again.  (Code Civ. Proc. § 430.41(a).)  Written correspondence is not sufficient.  The Demurring party made no attempt to speak with Plaintiff after Plaintiff filed the FAC.  

 

The Demurring party is required to file, no later than 7 days prior to the April 19th hearing date, a declaration demonstrating the parties spoke and discussed the substance of the present Demurrer, or at minimum, that a good faith attempt was made to speak with Plaintiff. 

 

The hearing on Defendant’s Special Motion to Strike pursuant to Code Civ. Proc. § 425.16, currently set for April 12, 2017, is also continued to April 19, 2017 at 9 a.m. in the Law & Motion Department.  The briefing deadlines do not change; they shall remain the same, as if the hearing were proceeding on April 12.  

 

In addition to discussing the Demurrer, the parties are encouraged to discuss the merits of the pending Special Motion to Strike under Code Civ. Proc. § 425.16, which the Court notes has a mandatory attorney’s fees provision.  See § 425.16(c)(1).  If, after meeting and conferring, Plaintiff chooses to withdraw any of the asserted causes of action, the Court should be notified at least 7 days before the April 19, 2017 hearing. 

 

If the tentative ruling is uncontested, it shall become the order of the Court, pursuant to Rule 3.1308(a)(1), adopted by Local Rule 3.10, effective immediately, and no formal order pursuant to Rule 3.1312 or any other notice is required as the tentative ruling affords sufficient notice to the parties.

 



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16-CIV-01174     DR. STEPHEN BOURQUE VS. CHRISTOPHER C. HALL, ET AL.

 

 

DR. STEPHEN BOURQUE                     PRO/PER

CHRISTOPHER C. HALL                     PATRICK J. WINGFIELD

 

 

2. MOTION TO COMPEL RESPONSES TO SPECIAL INTERROGATORIES, SET NUMBER ONE, AND REQUEST FOR MONETARY SANCTIONS IN THE AMOUNT OF $841.25 BY CHRISTOPHER C. HALL

TENTATIVE RULING:

 

The Motion to Compel Responses to Special Interrogatories, Set Number 1, is GRANTED. The Motion for Sanctions is GRANTED in the amount of $841.15.

 

Plaintiff shall serve verified responses without objections to Defendant’s Special Interrogatories, Set One, no later than April 20, 2017.

 

Plaintiff Stephen Bourque shall pay a monetary sanction of $841.15 to Defendant Law Office of Christopher C. Hall, no later than April 20, 2017.

 

If the tentative ruling is uncontested, it shall become the order of the Court, pursuant to Cal. Rules of Court, Rule 3.1308(a)(1), adopted by Local Rule 3.10.  If the tentative ruling is contested, prevailing party is directed to prepare, circulate, and submit a written order reflecting this Court’s ruling, verbatim, for the Court’s signature, consistent with the requirements of Cal. Rules of Court, Rule 3.1312.  The proposed order is to be submitted directly to Judge John L. Grandsaert, Department 11.

 

 

3. MOTION TO COMPEL RESPONSES TO DEMAND FOR PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS, SET NUMBER ONE, AND REQUEST FOR MONETARY SANCTIONS IN THE AMOUNT OF $841.25 BY CHRISTOPHER C. HALL

TENTATIVE RULING:

 

The Motion to Compel Responses to Demand for Production of Documents is GRANTED. The Motion for Sanctions is GRANTED in the amount of $841.15.

 

Plaintiff shall serve verified responses without objections to Defendant’s Request for Production of Documents, Set One, no later than April 20, 2017.

 

Plaintiff Stephen Bourque shall pay a monetary sanction of $841.15 to Defendant Law Office of Christopher C. Hall, no later than April 20, 2017.

 

If the tentative ruling is uncontested, it shall become the order of the Court, pursuant to Cal. Rules of Court, Rule 3.1308(a)(1), adopted by Local Rule 3.10.  If the tentative ruling is contested, prevailing party is directed to prepare, circulate, and submit a written order reflecting this Court’s ruling, verbatim, for the Court’s signature, consistent with the requirements of Cal. Rules of Court,,, Rule 3.1312.  The proposed order is to be submitted directly to Judge John L. Grandsaert, Department 11.

 

 

4. MOTION TO COMPEL RESPONSES TO FORM INTERROGATORIES (GENERAL), SET NUMBER ONE, AND REQUEST FOR MONETARY SANCTIONS IN THE AMOUNT OF $841.25 BY CHRISTOPHER C. HALL

TENTATIVE RULING:

 

The Motion to Compel Responses to Form Interrogatories (General) is GRANTED. The Motion for Sanctions is GRANTED in the amount of $841.15.

 

Plaintiff shall serve verified responses without objections to Defendant’s Form Interrogatories, Set One, no later than April 20, 2017.

 

Plaintiff Stephen Bourque shall pay a monetary sanction of $841.15 to Defendant Law Office of Christopher C. Hall, no later than April 20, 2017.

 

If the tentative ruling is uncontested, it shall become the order of the Court, pursuant to Cal. Rules of Court, Rule 3.1308(a)(1), adopted by Local Rule 3.10.  If the tentative ruling is contested, prevailing party is directed to prepare, circulate, and submit a written order reflecting this Court’s ruling, verbatim, for the Court’s signature, consistent with the requirements of Cal. Rules of Court, Rule 3.1312.  The proposed order is to be submitted directly to Judge John L. Grandsaert, Department 11.

 

 

5. MOTION FOR DEEMED ADMISSIONS AND REQUEST FOR MONETARY SANCTIONS IN THE AMOUNT OF $841.25 BY CHRISTOPHER C. HALL

TENTATIVE RULING:

 

The Motion for Deemed Admissions is GRANTED. Matters 1 through 35 in Defendant’s Request for Admissions (Set One), served September 19, 2016, are deemed admitted. The Motion for Sanctions is GRANTED in the amount of $841.15.

 

Plaintiff Stephen Bourque shall pay a monetary sanction of $841.15 to Defendant Law Office of Christopher C. Hall, no later than April 20, 2017.

 

If the tentative ruling is uncontested, it shall become the order of the Court, pursuant to Cal. Rules of Court, Rule 3.1308(a)(1), adopted by Local Rule 3.10.  If the tentative ruling is contested, prevailing party is directed to prepare, circulate, and submit a written order reflecting this Court’s ruling, verbatim, for the Court’s signature, consistent with the requirements of Cal. Rules of Court, Rule 3.1312.  The proposed order is to be submitted directly to Judge John L. Grandsaert, Department 11.

 

 

6. DEMURRER TO THE CROSS-COMPLAINT BY DR. STEPHEN BOURQUE

TENTATIVE RULING:

 

Cross-defendant Bourque’s papers fail to comply with California Rules of Court Rule 2.108(4) (spacing and numbering of lines on page).) Plaintiff/Cross-defendant Bourque shall comply with all California Rules of Court in future filings. 

 

Cross-defendant’s Demurrer to the Cross-complaint is OVERRULED. None of the causes of action is uncertain, and each pleads sufficient facts to state a claim.

 

The Demurrer argues that the first cause of action is deficient for failure to attach a copy of the contract. However, as an alternative, the pleading sufficiently sets forth the material facts and legal effect of the agreement.

 

The Demurrer argues that the second cause of action fails because the allegations are untrue. (Moving Points and Authorities at p.11.)  For purposes of a demurrer, however, the allegations are assumed true.

 

The Demurrer does not identify any specific deficiency in the third cause of action. Although titled “open book account,” the third cause of action alleges facts setting forth a claim for account stated. (See Cross-complaint para. 12.)

 

If the tentative ruling is uncontested, it shall become the order of the Court, pursuant to Cal. Rules of Court, Rule 3.1308(a)(1), adopted by Local Rule 3.10.  If the tentative ruling is contested, prevailing party is directed to prepare, circulate, and submit a written order reflecting this Court’s ruling, verbatim, for the Court’s signature, consistent with the requirements of Cal. Rules of Court, Rule 3.1312.  The proposed order is to be submitted directly to Judge John L. Grandsaert, Department 11.  



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16-CIV-01671     DENNIS BURT VS. KELLY ANN ODEA

 

 

DENNIS BURT                            PRO/PER

KELLY ANN ODEA                         DANIEL J. JUNGWIRTH

 

MOTION FOR ORDER COMPELLING RESPONSES TO FORM INTERROGATORIES, SPECIAL INTERROGATORIES AND DEMAND FOR INSPECTION; MOTION FOR ORDER COMPELLING ATTENDANCE AND TESTIMONY AT DEPOSITION AND REQUEST FOR MONETARY SANCTIONS

TENTATIVE RULING:

 

The Motion to Compel is GRANTED as to the written discovery.  Plaintiff shall provide verified responses, without objection, to the interrogatories and inspection demand within 10 days. 

 

The Request for Sanctions is also GRANTED pursuant to Code Civ. Proc. §§2030.290(c), and 2031.300(c).  Plaintiff shall pay defendant $390 within 10 days. 

 

The Motion to Compel Plaintiff to Appear for Deposition is DENIED.  Code Civ. Proc. §2025.450(a) provides for an order compelling a party to appear for deposition if, after service of deposition notice, he fails to appear without having served a valid objection.  Although the declaration of Daniel Jungwirth states that plaintiff did not appear, there is no indication that he did not serve a valid objection.  (Code Civ. Proc. §2025.450(a).)  The Motion also fails to comply with Code Civ. Proc. §2025.450(b)(1) and (2). 

 

If the tentative ruling is uncontested, it shall become the order of the Court, pursuant to Rule 3.1308(a)(1), adopted by Local Rule 3.10, effective immediately, and no formal order pursuant to Rule 3.1312 or any other notice is required as the tentative ruling affords sufficient notice to the parties.

 

 



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Line: 8

17-CIV-00084     JONATHAN ASSELIN-NORMAND VS. PACIFIC EURO HOTEL, ET AL.

 

 

JONATHAN ASSELIN-NORMAND                PRO/PER

RAPS HAYWARD, LLC DBA PACIFIC EURO HOTEL    DAVID R. ZARKA

 

 

DEMURRER TO COMPLAINT OF PLAINTIFF BY RAPS HAYWARD, LLC DBA PACIFIC EURO HOTEL AND ISH BHATT

TENTATIVE RULING:

 

Defendants RAPS HAYWARD, LLC dba PACIFIC EURO HOTEL and ISH BHATT’s Demurrer to Complaint is SUSTAINED, as follows:

 

  • SUSTAINED WITHOUT LEAVE TO AMEND as to the First cause of action for violation of the Unruh Civil Rights Act.  Plaintiff admits in his Opposition that the Unruh Civil Rights Act, Civil Code § 51 et seq. does not list age as a classification, and further acknowledges that courts have treated age classification differently from the categories specifically enumerated in the Act.  The Court in Pizarro v. Lamb’s Players Theatre (2006) 135 Cal.App.4th 1171 stated, “There is no general prohibition against all age-based discrimination or preferential treatment, as there is with the categories expressly mentioned in the Act.”  Id. at 1175.  Indeed, in order to state a claim for age discrimination under the Unruh Act, Plaintiff must show that Defendants’ conduct constituted “arbitrary, invidious, or unreasonable discrimination”.  Javorsky v. Western Athletic Clubs, Inc. (2015) 242 Cal.App.4th 1386.  The Javorsky court specifically held, “Discrimination may be reasonable, and not arbitrary, in light of the nature of the enterprise or its facilities, legitimate business interests (maintaining order, complying with legal requirements, and protecting business reputation or investment), and public policy supporting the disparate treatment.  Id. at 1395.

 

In Lazar v. Hertz Corp. (1999) 69 Cal.App.4th 1494, the Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court’s sustaining of defendant’s demurrer to plaintiff’s Unruh Act claim without leave to amend, stating: “The Unruh Act prohibits arbitrary discrimination by businesses on the basis of specified classifications such as age. The Unruh Act must be liberally construed to accomplish this purpose.  Despite this liberal construction, the California Supreme Court has determined that certain types of discrimination are reasonable and thus not arbitrary under the Unruh Act.  Businesses retain the right under the Unruh Act to establish reasonable regulations that are rationally related to the services performed and facilities provided. For example, a landowner may require prospective tenants to meet certain income criteria as long as the policy is applied alike to all persons. Such business practices are not arbitrary, but constitute prudent business practice. The restriction is thus reasonably related to the operation of that business.”  Id. at 1502 (Citations omitted).

 

Here, Plaintiff claims that Defendants’ policy of requiring persons under the age of 21 to be accompanied by someone 21 or older in order to check in is “arbitrary, invidious, or unreasonable discrimination”.  He does not elaborate on why this is so.  It is completely reasonable for a hotel to require a responsible adult to check in and accept liability for any charges incurred at the hotel, as well as for any damage caused by persons staying at its premises.  Plaintiff alleges that at the time he sought accommodations, he was still a minor, only 17 years old.  It would appear to be “prudent business practice” for a hotel business to refuse to rent to an unaccompanied teenager who has no parent or guardian to accept responsibility for the costs associated with his overnight stay.  Plaintiff fails to allege any facts, or proffer any convincing argument that the hotel’s policy is “arbitrary, invidious, or unreasonable discrimination” such that he can state an Unruh Act claim.

 

Moreover, Civil Code § 1865 expressly provides, “Where a minor unaccompanied by an adult seeks accommodations, the innkeeper may require a parent or guardian of the minor, or another responsible adult to assume in writing, full liability for any and all proper charges and other obligations incurred by the minor for accommodations, food and beverages, and other services provided by or through the innkeeper, as well as for any and all injuries or damages caused by the minor to any person or property.”  Absent this assumption of liability by a parent or guardian, Defendants would be authorized under this section to refuse accommodations to an unaccompanied minor, which Plaintiff undoubtedly was.  “The Unruh Act does not permit courts to engage in complex economic regulation under the guise of judicial decisionmaking…. That is a matter for the Legislature alone.  Judicial intervention in such economic issues is inappropriate.”  Lazar, supra at 1502-1503.

 

A demurrer is properly sustained when the pleadings fail to state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action.  Code Civ. Proc. § 430.10(e).  Plaintiff has not met his burden of showing in what manner he can amend the complaint to cure the defects raised by the demurrer.  Goodman v. Kennedy (1976) 18 Cal.3d 335, 349. Accordingly, the demurrer is sustained without leave to amend. 

 

  • SUSTAINED WITHOUT LEAVE TO AMEND as to the Second cause of action for breach of the common law duty of innkeepers.  This common law duty is limited to the duty not to charge unreasonably high rates.  Archibald v. Cinerama Hawaiian Hotels, Inc. (1977) 73 Cal.App.3d 152, 158, citing Munn v. Illinois (1877) 94 U.S. 113, 125.  Plaintiff has not alleged any facts regarding unreasonably high rates in his Complaint. 

 

  • SUSTAINED WITHOUT LEAVE TO AMEND as to the Third cause of action for negligence.  Plaintiff asserts that Defendants had a duty to operate their inn in a manner that was free from unlawful discrimination.  However, as set forth above, no unlawful discrimination occurred here.  Accordingly, this claim fails.

 

If the tentative ruling is uncontested, it shall become the order of the Court, pursuant to Rule 3.1308(a)(1), adopted by Local Rule 3.10, effective immediately, and no formal order pursuant to Rule 3.1312 or any other notice is required as the tentative ruling affords sufficient notice to the parties.

 



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CIV537783     LANCE WONG VS. CITY OF REDWOOD CITY, ET AL.

 

 

LANCE WONG                             DAVID W. WESSEL

CITY OF REDWOOD CITY                    RICHARD W. OSMAN

 

 

9. MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT OR, IN THE ALTERNATIVE, SUMMARY ADJUDICATION OF ISSUES BY CITY OF REDWOOD CITY

TENTATIVE RULING:

 

On the Court’s own motion, the Defendant City of Redwood City’s Motion for Summary Judgment, Or, In the Alternative, Summary Adjudication of Issues, is CONTINUED to April 6, 2017 at 9:00 A.M. in the Law & Motion Department. The Law & Motion Department did not receive the Reply to Opposition and companion pleadings until March 28, 2017, notwithstanding its timely filing, and the Court needs additional time to review the motion in light of the issues raised.

 

 

10. MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT, OR IN THE ALTERNATIVE, SUMMARY ADJUDICATION BY COUNTY OF SAN MATEO

TENTATIVE RULING:

 

Defendant County of San Mateo was dismissed from this case on March 22, 2017, therefore this Motion is MOOT.

 



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CLJ511610     CAVALRY SPV I, LLC VS. JUSTIN Y. WIN

 

 

CAVALRY SPV I, LLC                     STEPHEN S. ZELLER

JUSTIN Y. WIN                          SAM DEHBOZORGI

 

 

MOTION TO VACATE AND SET ASIDE DEFAULT AND DEFAULT JUDGMENT AND RECALL AND QUASH WRIT OF EXECUTION AND DISMISS BY JUSTIN WIN

TENTATIVE RULING:

 

The Motion to Vacate the Default and Default Judgment is GRANTED on the grounds of extrinsic fraud.  Defendant has offered evidence sufficient to show that service was not properly effected.  For purposes of a motion seeking relief from a default judgment, extrinsic fraud is interpreted broadly which tends to encompass all circumstances that deprive an adversary of fair notice of hearing whether or not those circumstances would qualify as fraudulent in the strict sense.  Thus, a false recital of service although not deliberate is treated as extrinsic fraud for purposes of relief from default.  (Munoz v. Lopez (1969) 275 Cal.App.2d 178.) 

 

The Motion to Dismiss this action is also GRANTED pursuant to Code Civ. Proc. § 583.250(2).  Service of the summons and complaint was not effected within three years of commencement of the action. 

 

Defendant seeks the recall of outstanding writs of execution and the return of any levied property. The Court GRANTS that request, quashing all writs of execution issued in this case.  The Court is not aware of any property executed upon. 

 

If the tentative ruling is uncontested, it shall become the order of the Court, pursuant to Rule 3.1308(a)(1), adopted by Local Rule 3.10, effective immediately, and no formal order pursuant to Rule 3.1312 or any other notice is required as the tentative ruling affords sufficient notice to the parties.

 

 



 

 

In the Superior Court of the State of California

In and for the County of San Mateo

 

WRITS AND RECEIVERS CALENDAR

Judge: Honorable GEORGE A. MIRAM

Department 28

 

400 County Center, Redwood City

Courtroom 2F

 

Thursday, March 30, 2017

 

If you plan to appear on any case on this calendar,

 you must call (650) 261-5128 before 4:00 p.m. and you must give notice also before 4:00 p.m. to all parties of your intent to appear pursuant to California Rules of Court 3.1308(a)(1).

 

Case                  Title / Nature of Case

2:00

Lines: 1 & 2

16-CIV-01058     MARK CHURCH vs. SAN MATEO COUNTY ASSESSMENT APPEALS

                    BOARD

 

 

mark CHURCh                            REBECCA M. ARCHER

SAN MATEO COUNTY ASSESSMENT APPEALS BOARD

 

 

1. demurrer to PETITIONER'S FIRST AMENDED PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS RE THE FIRST AND SECOND CAUSES OF ACTION

TENTATIVE RULING:

 

 

 

2. case management conference

TENTATIVE RULING:

 

     The demurrer by Genentech, Inc. to the First and Second Causes of Action in

     the First Amended Petition for Writ of Mandate is OVERRULED. Answer within  

     fifteen days.

 

     First, this court has made no factual finding as to whether or not

     collateral estoppel applies to the assets acquired during the five years in

     question. The order granting the Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings

     merely found that an affirmative defense was presented from matters of

     which this court took judicial notice, and offered the Assessor an

     opportunity to “plead around” that affirmative defense.  The facts alleged

     in the First Amended Petition for Writ of Mandate clearly demonstrate that

     collateral estoppel should not apply and that the capitalization of

     interest and debugging costs determination must be made on an asset by

     asset basis.

 

     Second, the facts alleged in the First Amended Petition for Writ of

     Mandate, which this court must accept as true, establish that for the seven

     tax years running from 1992 to 1999, that immediately precede the tax years

     in question here, the Appeals Board determined that capitalized interest

     and debugging costs should be included in the assessment.  Since those

     decisions are now final, Genentech would appear to be collaterally estopped

     from asserting that there has been no change because there has been a

     binding determination that change occurred.

 

     Third, the facts alleged in the First Amended Petition for Writ of Mandate,

     which this court must accept as true, establish that the Appeals Board

     rejected Genentech’s collateral estoppel argument and expressly held “the

     inclusion of capitalized interest depends on a factual determination of

     whether the particular equipment at issue was “self-constructed.”

     (2016AR06982:6-13).  Genentech has not sought review of that determination.    

 



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Line: 3

17-CIV-00316     SAN FRANCISCO BAY MARINAS FOR ALL, INC. vs. CITY OF

                      REDWOOD CITY, et al.

 

 

SAN FRANCISCO BAY MARINAS FOR ALL, INC. GARY F. REDENBACHER

CITY OF REDWOOD CITY

 

 

Order to show cause RE: PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION

TENTATIVE RULING:

 

     The Application for Preliminary Injunction by Plaintiff San Francisco Bay

     Marinas for All is DENIED.

 

     First, it does not appear that there is a reasonable likelihood that

     Plaintiff will prevail on the merits of its claim because (a) the sole

     remedy to enjoin legislative or administrative acts such as those in

     question is a petition for writ of mandate; (b) not only does the weight of

     evidence establish that the City of Redwood City had jurisdiction over

     Docktown that authorized it to perform the acts in question, but Plaintiff

     has admitted in pleadings filed in a related law suit that the City had

     jurisdiction, thereby contradicting the pleadings filed herein; and (c)

     even if the Settlement Agreement that gave rise to the Docktown Plan were

     set aside, the Docktown Plan itself would remain as an enforceable, valid,

     legislative act.

 

     Second, the type of legislative and administrative acts by the City that

     are at issue here are entitled to great deference and there is no showing

     of significant or irreparable harm.  Most of the Docktown Plan provides

     services and benefits to the Docktown liveaboards, and cannot be viewed as

     in any way harming those individuals.  While the Docktown Plan also

     provides for the eventual eviction of those Docktown liveaboards who fail

     to relocate, any implementation of legal process designed to fairly

     adjudicate the respective rights with regards to a proposed eviction does

     not constitute harm, let alone irreparable harm.  The fact that an eviction

     has detrimental effect on the evicted tenant is not harm if the tenant has

     no legal right to continued possession of the premises.

 

 



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17-CIV-00783     KEVIN CLAY vs. GOLARA MOKHTARI

 

 

KEVIN CLAY                             PETER N. BREWEr

GOLARA MOKHTARI

 

 

Order to show cause RE: temporary restraining order

TENTATIVE RULING:

 

The OSC is discharged and the Preliminary Injunction is DENIED.  There is no response and no personal jurisdiction as to the defendant as there is no evidence on file of service of the Summons and Complaint.  Posting and mailing without leave of Court, is not adequate notice, absent personal service of the Summons and Complaint.

 

 



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CIV536764     VIOLETA GRIGORESCU VS. THE SUPERIOR COURT

 

 

VIOLETA GRIGORESCU                     GEORGE F. CAMERLENGO

BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF THE SAN MATEO      JOSHUA E. MORRISON

COMMUNITY CoLLEGE DISTRICT

 

 

5. demurrer to UNVERIFIED THIRD AMENDED COMPLAINT FOR DAMAGES AND PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDATE

TENTATIVE RULING:

 

Off calendar.

 

 

6. motion to strike portions of THIRD AMENDED COMPLAINT FOR DAMAGES AND PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDATE

TENTATIVE RULING:

 

Off Calendar.

 


 

 

 


POSTED:  3:00 PM

 

 

 

 

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