July 30, 2015
Law & Motions Tentative Rulings
  • Law and Motion Department Tentative Ruling Line:  (650) 261-5019
  • Other Judges' tentatives: please reference the appropriate Case Number and Case Caption below and contact the appropriate department.

Telephonic Appearances (CourtCall): If an appearance is required or if a party has provided timely notice of intent to appear by 4:00 p.m. to the court and all parties, any party may appear telephonically through CourtCall. To do so, you must contact CourtCall at (888) 882-6878 no later than 4:30 p.m. on the court day prior to the hearing. Notifying CourtCall with your intent to appear is not an alternative to notifying the court. Please visit their website for more information. Please also see California Rule of Court No. 3.670.

 

In the Superior Court of the State of California

In and for the County of San Mateo

 

Law and Motion Calendar

Judge: Honorable JOSEPH C. SCOTT

Department 25

 

400 County Center, Redwood City

Courtroom 2G

 

Monday, July 27, 2015

 

IF YOU INTEND TO APPEAR ON ANY CASE ON THIS CALENDAR YOU MUST DO THE FOLLOWING:

1. YOU MUST CALL (650) 261-5019 BEFORE 4:00 P.M. TO INFORM THE COURT OF YOUR INTENT TO APPEAR.

2. You must give notice before 4:00 P.M. to all parties of your intent to appear pursuant to California Rules of Court 3.1308(a)(1).

 

Failure to do both items 1 and 2 will result in no oral presentation.

 

N.B. Notifying CourtCall with your intent to appear is not an alternative to notifying the court.  

 

All Counsel are reminded to comply with California Rule of Court 3.1110.  The Court will expect all exhibits to be tabbed accordingly. 

 

    Case                  Title / Nature of Case

9:00

1

CIV 410586       EDITH INGRAM, ET AL. VS. RAMIN YEGANEH, ET AL.

 

 

EDITH M. INGRAM                          MICHAEL M. MARKMAN

RAMIN YEGANEH                            GEORGE P. ESHOO

 

 

MOTION TO SET ASIDE VOID JUDGMENT AND FOR RESTITUTIONARY RELIEF BY RAMIN YEGANEH

 

 

·         The Motion to Set Aside the Judgment is DENIED.  Defendant has not established that the court was without jurisdiction to award attorney’s fees pending resolution of his appeal from the underlying judgment.  Pursuant to CCP §916(a) the court retains jurisdiction to proceed on any matter not embraced in or affected by the appealed judgment or order. 

 

·         Numerous cases hold that an award of attorney’s fees is a collateral matter as to which the court retains jurisdiction pending appeal. [See Bankes v. Lucas (1992) 9 Cal.App.4th 365, Robertson v. Rodriguez (1995) 36 Cal.App.4th 347, 360; Carpenter v. Jack In The Box Corp. (2007) 151 Cal.App.4th 454, 461]. 

 

·         To the extent defendant argues the court violated the stay pending appeal by amending the judgment to include the fees, he cites no authority to support this assertion.  The cases on which he relies found the court lacked jurisdiction to make a material change in the terms of a judgment that had been appealed other than the addition of attorney’s fees or they involve proceedings not collateral to the appealed judgment or order.  Even where a trial court made material changes beyond the addition of attorney’s fees, jurisdiction to award attorney’s fees was upheld.  [See People v. Bhakta (2008) 162 Cal.App.4th 973].

 

·         Prevailing party is directed to prepare a written order consistent with the Court’s ruling for the Court’s signature, pursuant to California Rules of Court, Rule 3.1312, and provide notice thereof to the opposing party/counsel as required by law and the California Rules of Court.  The order is to be submitted directly to Judge Joseph C. Scott, Department 25.

 

 

 

_____________________________________________________________________


9:00

2

CIV 528694       TERRY BROOKS VS. DUDLEY PERKINS COMPANY

 

 

TERRY BROOKS                          BRIAN L. LARSEN

DUDLEY PERKINS COMPANY                MATTHEW S CONANT

 

 

MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT/SUMMARY ADJUDICATION OF ISSUES BY

DUDLEY PERKINS

 

 

·         Moot. Case was dismissed June 16, 2015.

 

 

_____________________________________________________________________


9:00

3

CIV 528870       MARICELA AWARD-BARRON VS. MARIA HINOJOSA, ET AL.

 

 

MARICELA AWARD-BARRON                 T. TROY OTUS

MARIA HINOJOSA                        JAMES P. MOLINELLI

 

 

MOTION FOR TERMINATING SANCTIONS, OR ALTERNATIVELY, EVIDENTIARY, ISSUE

PRECLUSION & MONETARY SANCTIONS IN THE AMOUNT OF $1,489.85 AS AGAINST PLAINTIFF & HER COUNSEL BY MARIA HINOJOSA, ET AL.

 

 

  • Defendants’ Motion for Terminating Sanctions, Or Alternatively, Evidentiary, Issue Preclusion & Monetary Sanctions in the Amount of $1,489.85 as Against Plaintiff & Her Counsel is GRANTED IN PART.  Plaintiff is ordered to complete her deposition before August 27, 2015. Defendants are awarded monetary sanctions against Plaintiff and her attorneys, jointly and severally, of $540. Sanctions, including previous sanctions awarded, shall be paid no later than August 27, 2015.  Other requested sanctions are DENIED WITHOUT PREJUDICE.

 

  • Moving party is directed to prepare a written order consistent with the Court’s ruling for the Court’s signature, pursuant to California Rules of Court, Rule 3.1312, and provide notice thereof to the opposing party/counsel as required by law and the California Rules of Court.  The order is to be submitted directly to Judge Joseph C. Scott, Department 25.

 

 

_____________________________________________________________________


9:00

4

CIV 530694       FIORINA FARMS, LLC., ET AL. VS. BRANSCOMB FARMS, LLC.

 

 

FIORINA FARMS, LLC.                   GREGORY K. KLINGSPORN

BRANSCOMB FARMS, LLC.                 DAVID IVESTER

 

 

MOTION AND SPECIAL MOTION TO STRIKE BY JEAN L PLUMMER, FRENCHMANS CREEK WATER DISTRICT, LLC

 

 

  • Cross-defendants’ Motion to Strike the Cross-complaint pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16 is DENIED. Moving parties have failed to establish that the Cross-Complaint stems from protected activity as required under the anti-SLAPP statute. (See City of Cotati v. Cashman (2002) 29 Cal. 4th 69, 76-80) It is clear that the subject Cross-complaint arises out of Cross-defendants’ actions in cutting off water to Branscomb Farms, rather than Cross-defendants’ right to petition or free speech.

 

·         Prevailing party is directed to prepare a written order consistent with the Court’s ruling for the Court’s signature, pursuant to California Rules of Court, Rule 3.1312, and provide notice thereof to the opposing party/counsel as required by law and the California Rules of Court.  The order is to be submitted directly to Judge Joseph C. Scott, Department 25.

 

 

 

_____________________________________________________________________


9:00

5

CLJ 209576       JOHN F. BRITTON, vs. JOHN MURILLO, et al

 

 

JOHN F. BRITTON                       RODNEY M. SWEET

JOHN MURILLO

 

 

ORDER TO ASSIGN RIGHT TO PAYMENT PURSUANT TO 708.510 (CCP) BY JOHN F. BRITTON

 

 

  • Plaintiff JOHN F. BRITTON’s Motion for Order to Assign Right to Payment is GRANTED.  [Code Civ. Proc. § 708.510]. 

 

  • Plaintiff is directed to prepare a written order consistent with the Court’s ruling for the Court’s signature, pursuant to California Rules of Court, Rule 3.1312, and provide notice thereof to the opposing party/counsel as required by law and the California Rules of Court.  The order is to be submitted directly to Judge Joseph C. Scott, Department 25.

 

 

 

 

_____________________________________________________________________


9:00

6

CLJ 211360       GORDON KENNY REALTY, INC. VS FRANCISCO TORRES

 

 

GORDON KENNY REALTY, INC              MARK C WATSON

FRANCISCO TORRES                      DANIEL SAVER

 

 

MOTION TO QUASH SERVICE OF SUMMONS ON COMPLAINT (UNLAWFUL DETAINER) of GORDON KENNY REALTY, INC FILED BY FRANCISCO TORRES

 

 

  • The unopposed Motion to Quash by Defendant Francisco Torres is GRANTED.

 

·         The 60-Day Notice is insufficient and an insufficient notice will not support a complaint for unlawful detainer. The notice in this case is deficient. It is filed in conformance with Civil Code §1946.1 but fails to include all of the required language under that code section.

 

  • Moving party is directed to prepare a written order consistent with the Court’s ruling for the Court’s signature, pursuant to California Rules of Court, Rule 3.1312, and provide notice thereof to the opposing party/counsel as required by law and the California Rules of Court.  The order is to be submitted directly to Judge Joseph C. Scott, Department 25.

 

 

 

 

 

_____________________________________________________________________


9:01

7

CLJ 533861       AMALGAMATED TRANSIT UNION LOCAL NO 1574, AFL-CIO-CLC

                    VS. SAN MATEO COUNTY TRANSIT DISTRICT

 

 

AMALGAMATED TRANSIT UNION LOCAL NO 1574, AFL-CIO-CLC  DANIEL T. PURTELL

SAN MATEO COUNTY TRANSIT DISTRICT

 

 

PETITION TO COMPEL ARBITRATION

 

·       The petition to compel arbitration is GRANTED.  The parties’ collective bargaining (CBA) agreement provides for arbitration of grievances which have been decided in a manner unsatisfactory to the Union. [ See Verified Petition, Ex. A at Article 31].  The evidence establishes that the Union filed a grievance and that it requested arbitration after preliminary procedures did not result in a satisfactory resolution.  [See Purtell Declaration, ¶¶9-11; O’Malley declaration, ¶¶2-4].

 

·       While the District argues the matter was ultimately settled prior to a scheduled arbitration hearing, the evidence regarding the parties’ conduct concerning the alleged settlement is ambiguous and would indicate that certain essential terms were not agreed upon.  In addition, the CBA, signed by the moving and responding parties, requires that, to be effective, any settlement must be in writing.  The District has not established that the January 22, 2015 e-mail constitutes a signed writing within the meaning of the collective bargaining agreement. 

 

·       The District’s alternative assertion that an agreement to settle should be found based on the doctrine of collateral estoppel also is not persuasive.  A clear and unambiguous promise is an element essential to application of the doctrine.  [US Ecology, Inc. v. State (2005) 129 Cal.App.4th 887].  As noted above, the evidence does not establish the Union made a clear and unambiguous promise to settle the grievance.  Additionally, the District has not shown that the equitable estoppel doctrine may be used in the manner it proposes.  Promissory estoppel is a doctrine which employs equitable principles to satisfy the requirement that consideration must be given in exchange for a promise sought to be enforced.  [Kajima v. Los Angeles County Metropolitan Transportation Authority  (2000) 23 Cal.4th 305].  The reason for this requirement is because the doctrine allows enforcement of a promise otherwise unenforceable, courts are given wide discretion in its application. [US Ecology, Inc. v. State of California (2005) 129 Cal.App.4th 887].   The District offers no authority indicating the doctrine may be used to circumvent the express provisions of a contract.  As noted above, the collective bargaining agreement requires a written settlement agreement.

 

·         Petitioner is directed to prepare a written order consistent with the Court’s ruling for the Court’s signature, pursuant to California Rules of Court, Rule 3.1312, and provide notice thereof to the opposing party/counsel as required by law and the California Rules of Court.  The order is to be submitted directly to Judge Joseph C. Scott, Department 25.

 

 

 

 

_____________________________________________________________________

 

 

 

 


POSTED:  3:00 PM

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

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