September 16, 2014
Law & Motions Tentative Rulings
  • Law and Motion Department Tentative Ruling Line:  (650) 261-5019
  • Other Judges' tentatives: please reference the appropriate Case Number and Case Caption below and contact the appropriate department.

Telephonic Appearances (CourtCall): If an appearance is required or if a party has provided timely notice of intent to appear by 4:00 p.m. to the court and all parties, any party may appear telephonically through CourtCall. To do so, you must contact CourtCall at (888) 882-6878 no later than 4:30 p.m. on the court day prior to the hearing. Notifying CourtCall with your intent to appear is not an alternative to notifying the court. Please visit their website for more information. Please also see California Rule of Court No. 3.670.

In the Superior Court of the State of California

In and for the County of San Mateo

 

Law and Motion Calendar

Judge: Honorable ELIZABETH K. LEE

Department 17

 

400 County Center, Redwood City

Courtroom 2M

 

SEPTEMBER 12, 2014

 

IF YOU INTEND TO APPEAR ON ANY CASE ON THIS CALENDAR YOU MUST DO THE FOLLOWING:

1. YOU MUST CALL (650) 261-5019 BEFORE 4:00 P.M. TO INFORM THE COURT OF YOUR INTENT TO APPEAR.

2. You must give notice before 4:00 P.M. to all parties of your intent to appear pursuant to California Rules of Court 3.1308(a)(1).

 

Failure to do both items 1 and 2 will result in no oral presentation.

 

N.B. Notifying CourtCall with your intent to appear is not an alternative to notifying the court.  

 

All Counsel are reminded to comply with California Rule of Court 3.1110.  The Court will expect all exhibits to be tabbed accordingly. 

 

    Case                  Title / Nature of Case

9:00

1

CIV 481038       CANDACE S. GRAHAM VS. NET EQUITY ASSOCIATES, INC., ET

                   AL.

 

 

CANDACE S. GRAHAM                     BRADFORD F. GINDER

NET EQUITY ASSOCIATES, INC.

 

 

MOTION CONTESTING DEFENDANTS' APPLICATIONS FOR DETERMINATION OF GOOD FAITH SETTLEMENT BY NORTH AMERICAN TITLE COMPANY, INC.

 

 

·         This matter is being continued to November 13, 2014 at 9:00 a.m. so that Defendant North American Title Company, Inc. may bring a motion to vacate Judge Lisa A. Novak’s order of July 30, 2014 granting the Application for Good Faith Settlement of the other settling defendant in this case, Robyn Lee.  This Court will consider this motion brought by North American Title Company, Inc. after Judge Novak makes her ruling.

 

_____________________________________________________________________

9:00

2

CIV 514443       JOHN HEALY VS. MICHAEL RABBITT, ET AL.

 

 

JOHN HEALY                            KEVIN D. FREDERICK

MICHAEL RABBITT                       BRIAN W. NEWCOMB

 

 

MOTION TO JOIN SARAH HEALY AS A PARTY TO THE ACTION BY MICHAEL RABBITT AND HENRY J. RABBITT & SONS, INC.

 

 

·         This matter is moot.  The parties have stipulated that Plaintiff may join Sarah Healy as a party to the action.

 

_____________________________________________________________________

9:00

3

CIV 518611       DIRA INVESTMENTS, INC. VS. STEPHEN RIVERA, ET AL.

 

 

DIRA INVESTMENTS, INC.                MAC E. NEHORAY

STEPHEN RIVERA

 

 

MOTION FOR ORDER COMPELLING RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS, SET ONE, AND REQUEST FOR MONETARY SANCTIONS BY PRIVATE CAPITAL FUND, LLC AND STONECREST MANAGERS, INC.

 

 

·         Defendants Private Capital Fund, LLC and Stonecrest Managers, Inc.’s unopposed Motion to Compel Responses to Request for Production of Documents is GRANTED pursuant to CCP § 2031.300(b).  Plaintiff is ORDERED to provide verified responses without objection to Defendant’s Request for Production of Documents, Set One, within 10 days of service of notice of this order.

 

·         Defendants Private Capital Fund, LLC and Stonecrest Managers, Inc.’s Request for Sanctions is GRANTED pursuant to CCP § 2031.300(c) and Cal. Rule of Court, Rule 3.1348.  Defendants shall be awarded $1,162.50 in attorneys’ fees and costs. 

 

·         Moving party is directed to prepare a written order consistent with the Court’s ruling for the Court’s signature, pursuant to California Rules of Court, Rule 3.1312, and provide notice thereof to the opposing party/counsel as required by law and the California Rules of Court.  The order is to be submitted directly to Judge Elizabeth K. Lee, Department 17.

 

_____________________________________________________________________

9:00

4

CIV 519420       SARAH C. ZIGLER VS. STEVEN G. HILL

 

 

SARAH C. ZIGLER                       DANIEL L. CASAS

STEVEN G. HILL                        MICHAEL E. CARDOZA

 

 

MOTION FOR SUMMARY ADJUDICATION OF ISSUES BY STEVEN G. HILL

 

 

·         Defendant’s Objections 1 through 5 (e-mails attached to Declaration of Casas) will be sustained if Defendant complies with CRC Rule 3.1354(c) (order must be submitted with objections).

 

·         The Motion for Summary Adjudication is denied as to Issue Nos. 1, 2, 4 and 5.  Business & Professions Code § 5050 prohibits anyone from engaging in “public accountancy” without a permit.  It is undisputed that Plaintiff does not have a permit.  (UMF 1.)  The issue is whether Plaintiff engaged in public accountancy as defined in Section 5051.

 

·         Section 5051, subdivision (a) defines public accountancy to include “[holding oneself] out . . . as one skilled in the knowledge, science, and practice of accounting, and as qualified and ready to render professional service therein as a public accountant for compensation.”   The only material fact addressing “holding herself out” as engaging in public accounting is Material Fact 3 (“Zigler repeatedly represented herself as a forensic accountant”). Defendant’s evidence supports this fact, with the exception of Exhibit N to Declaration of Larson, which is nonexistent, and Deposition of Sarah Astles in Zigler v. Hill, which Defendant did not file.  Thus, it is undisputed that Plaintiff represented herself and held herself out as a “forensic accountant.”

 

·         No evidence, however, supports the contention that holding oneself out as a “forensic accountant” is the same as holding oneself out “as one skilled in the knowledge, science, and practice of accounting, and as qualified and ready to render professional service therein as a public accountant for compensation.”  Defendant offers no argument, testimony or other evidence to support that contention.  The moving papers contain no definition or description of “forensic accountant.”

 

·         Defendant also argues subdivisions (c) through (f) of Section 5051, which set forth numerous activities constituting “public accountancy.”  Again, Defendant’s motion contains no evidence that Plaintiff performed any of those services.  The January 28, 2007 invoice (Exhibit A to Declaration of Hill) lists five sets of services, none of which is specific enough such that, as a matter of law, they necessarily fall within Section 5051.  Plaintiff testified about the services she performed, but her description of services also is too general to compel a finding that she engaged in public accountancy.  (See Zigler Deposition at 70:28 – 71:7 (attached as Ex. J. to Declaration of Larson).)

 

·         Subdivision (d) includes preparation of certain documents for “filing in court” as constituting public accountancy.  Defendant argues that “Zigler did prepare reports as a forensic accountant for filing with a federal court in the Hill v. Wang lawsuit and for filing with the San Mateo County Superior Court in the Hill v. Hill lawsuit.”  Defendant Hill cites Material Facts 2 and 15 in support.  (Moving P&A at 9:6-12.)  However, Material Fact 2 does not support the contention that Plaintiff Zigler prepared reports for filing in court; it merely states that Plaintiff Zigler alleged in her complaint that she provided forensic accounting services.  Material Fact 15 is nonexistent.  The Separate Statement contains only ten material facts for Issue 1.

 

·         Although Defendant’s motion makes several references to Plaintiff’s performing “forensic accounting,” there is no evidence that demonstrates that Plaintiff’s services are the type described in Section 5051, subdivisions (a) or (c) through (f).

 

·         The Motion for Summary Adjudication is granted as to Issue 3.  It is undisputed that the claims for $96,600 are time-barred unless revived by Hill’s oral promise at the August 2011 settlement conference.  However, Code of Civil Procedure § 360 requires that “no acknowledgment or promise” is sufficient to revive a time-barred claim unless in writing and signed by the party to be charged.  It is undisputed that the purported “agreement” at the August 2011 settlement conference was not reduced to a writing.

 

·         Plaintiff’s reliance on General Credit Corp. v Pichel (1975) 44 Cal.App.3d 844 lacks merit as the debtor in that case executed a writing on the promise.  Section 360 was not an issue.  The case of Bailey v. Breetwor (1962) 206 Cal.App.2d 287 does not apply.  In that case, new performance in the form of additional services was consideration for the promise to pay.  (Bailey, supra, at 292 [“This performance was clearly beyond the scope of the original contract. Bailey thus incurred a new detriment and Breetwor received a new benefit constituting sufficient consideration for Breetwor's promise”].)   Unlike the creditor in Bailey, Plaintiff gave no new performance or additional services.  Her promise to refrain from pursuing the remainder of the debt is illusory since the entire claim was time-barred.  Plaintiff incurred no additional detriment for Defendant’s promise to pay $96,600.

 

·         The Motion for Summary Adjudication is denied as to Issue 6.  Defendant Hill’s argument that the loan is a “demand note” under Commercial Code § 3108 lacks merit.  Section 3108 falls within Division 3, which applies only to “negotiable  instruments.”  (Comm. Code § 3102 [“this division applies to negotiable instruments. It does not apply to money . . . .”].)  Defendant’s arguments about the January 2012 e-mail addresses only whether the “demand note” survives the Statute of Limitations.  Since the loan is not a demand note, these arguments are moot. 

 

·         The $18,000 loan was oral (SAC ¶ 39), which is subject to a two-year statute of limitations.  (Code of Civ. Proc. § 339.)  As to an oral agreement, Defendant makes no argument about when payment was due. (The Complaint alleges no due date.)  Therefore, the evidence does not show when the breach occurred and the statute began to run.  The motion fails to demonstrate that an oral agreement is time-barred.

 

·         Moving party is directed to prepare a written order consistent with the Court’s ruling for the Court’s signature, pursuant to California Rules of Court, Rule 3.1312, and provide notice thereof to the opposing party/counsel as required by law and the California Rules of Court.  The order is to be submitted directly to Judge Elizabeth K. Lee, Department 17.

 

_____________________________________________________________________

9:00

5

CIV 521495       DAVID BOYD VS. WILLIAM BOYD

 

 

DAVID BOYD                            MICHAEL D. LIBERTY

WILLIAM BOYD                          ANNE MARIE MURPHY

 

 

MOTION FOR BIFURCATED TRIAL BY WILLIAM BOYD

 

 

·         Defendant WILLIAM BOYD’s Motion to Bifurcate is DENIED.  The Court finds that it would not be in the interests of convenience, expedience or economy to bifurcate the trial in order to separate out the Statute of Limitations defense.  Code Civ. Proc. § 597.  The evidence required for both of Defendant’s proposed phases would be largely duplicative and thus inefficient to bifurcate.

 

·         Here, bifurcating the trial into two phases is actually likely to be less efficient and consume more resources than if the trial proceeds in one phase.  Although a disposition in favor of Defendant on the Statute of Limitations issue would obviate the need for a trial on the merits of Plaintiff’s causes of action, the facts underlying each phase are almost duplicative.  Defendant has identified the central issue underlying the Statute of Limitations to be whether the alleged loans were payable on demand or if they were due when Defendant had the ability to pay.  Resolution of this issue necessarily demands evidence regarding the brothers’ discussions of the loans, Defendant’s alleged representations regarding his ability to pay or not pay, etc.  This evidence is also necessary for a trial on the merits of Plaintiff’s causes of action. 

 

·         While Defendant argues bifurcation would save time and money because if the Statute of Limitations issue is resolved in favor of the defendant, it would obviate the need to try the merits of the plaintiff’s action; if the matter is resolved in favor of the plaintiff, more time and money would be spent presenting much of the same evidence at trial.

 

·         Plaintiff’s argument that a motion to bifurcate should be heard by the judge presiding over the trial is unavailing.  CCP § 597 does not specify that the “trial judge” must hear a motion to bifurcate.  Further, San Mateo County specifically states that the Law and Motion judge may hear motions to bifurcate.  See https://www.sanmateocourt.org/hearingscal/lmhearings.php.

 

·         If the tentative ruling is uncontested, it shall become the order of the Court, pursuant to Rule 3.1308(a)(1), adopted by Local Rule 3.10, effective immediately, and no formal order pursuant to Rule 3.1312 or any other notice is required as the tentative ruling affords sufficient notice to the parties. 

 

_____________________________________________________________________

9:00

6

CIV 521548       ADREIN TUZZIO VS. STANFORD HOSPITAL AND CLINICS, ET

                   AL.

 

 

ADREIN TUZZIO                         JEFFREY M. CURTISS

STANFORD HOSPITAL AND CLINICS         MICHAEL D. BRUNO

 

 

MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT/SUMMARY ADJUDICATION OF ISSUES BY

STANFORD HOSPITAL AND CLINICS AGAINST ADREIN TUZZIO

 

 

·         This matter is moot.  On September 5, 2014, Defendant Stanford Hospital and Clinics was dismissed from this matter with prejudice.

 

_____________________________________________________________________

9:00

7

CIV 528623       DAVID G. ARELLA VS. WELLS FARGO BANK, N.A., ET AL.

 

 

DAVID G. ARELLA                       LILIA BULGUCHEVA

WELLS FARGO BANK, N.A.                CHANEL L. OLDHAM

 

 

DEMURRER TO COMPLAINT of ARELLA BY WELLS FARGO BANK, N.A.

 

 

·         This matter is moot.  Plaintiff filed a First Amended Complaint on September 11, 2014. 

 

_____________________________________________________________________

9:00

8

CIV 528671       MASAZUMI INOUE, ET AL. VS. BAYVIEW LOAN SERVICING,

                   LLC, ET AL.

 

 

MASAZUMI INOUE                        PATRICIA RODRIGUEZ

BAYVIEW LOAN SERVICING, LLC           EDWARD G. SCHLOSS

 

 

DEMURRER TO FIRst Amended COMPLAINT of INOUE BY BAYVIEW LOAN SERVICING, LLC, E*TRADE FINANCIAL CORPORATION, SEASIDE TRUSTEE, INC. AND MORTGAGE ELECTRONIC REGISTRATION SYSTEMS, INC.

 

 

·         Defendants BAYVIEW LOAN SERVICING, LLC; E*TRADE FINANCIAL CORPORATION; SEASIDE TRUSTEE, INC. and MORTGAGE ELECTRONIC REGISTRATION SYSTEMS, INC.’s Demurrer to First Amended Complaint is SUSTAINED WITHOUT LEAVE TO AMEND as to all causes of action, as follows:

 

  • As to the 1st through 7th Causes of Action on the ground that Plaintiffs have failed to allege tender.  California law requires Plaintiff to allege tender of the amount of his indebtedness in order to maintain any cause of action for irregularity in the foreclosure procedure.  Abdallah v. United Savings Bank (1996) 43 Cal.App.4th 1101, 1109.  This requirement applies to claims “implicitly integrated” with the foreclosure sale – not merely claims that challenge the sale, but also those that seek damages related to the sale.  Karlsen v. American Sav. & Loan Assn. (1971) 15 Cal.App.3d 112, 121.  The plaintiff must (1) demonstrate a willingness to pay and (2) show the ability to pay.  In re: Worcester (9th Cir. 1987) 811 F.2d 1224, 1231. 

 

  • All of Plaintiffs’ seven causes of action are implicitly integrated with the foreclosure sale in that they challenge Defendants’ authority to conduct a foreclosure.  Thus, the tender rule applies.  The FAC does not allege any specific facts demonstrating that an exception to the tender rule applies.  While Plaintiffs’ Opposition gives various examples of recognized exceptions to the tender rule, it sets forth no facts or argument as to what exception applies and/or how Plaintiffs would amend their Complaint to cure this defect.  While a demurrer should not be sustained without leave to amend if there is a reasonable possibility that a defect in the Complaint can be cured by amendment, the burden is on the plaintiff to show in what manner he or she can amend the Complaint and how that amendment will affect the pleading.  Goodman v. Kennedy (1976) 18 Cal.3d 335, 349. 

 

  • Additional grounds for sustaining Defendants’ demurrer are as follows:  As to the 1st Cause of Action for wrongful foreclosure, Plaintiffs allege no facts supporting their claim that their loan was securitized and transferred into a “Trust” before the Trust’s “closing date,” thus making the transaction void.  Defendants in a non-judicial foreclosure proceeding are not required to meet an additional requirement of showing that they are authorized to initiate a foreclosure.  Gomes v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc. (2011) 192 Cal.App.4th 1149, 1154, fn. 5. 

 

  • As to the 2nd Cause of Action for violation of Civil Code § 2924(a)(6), Plaintiffs fail to state a claim.  Insofar as Plaintiffs allege that their Note was separated from the Deed of Trust, the California Court of Appeals has found that “statutory provisions for non-judicial foreclosure do not require that the promissory note be in the physical possession of the person initiating the foreclosure…nor do they require a beneficial interest in both the note and the deed of trust to commence a non-judicial foreclosure.”  Debrunner v. Deutsche National Trust Co. (2012) 204 Cal.App.4th 433, 440-41.  With respect to Plaintiffs’ allegation that the foreclosing entity did not lawfully receive a beneficial interest in the subject property, this allegation is belied by the Assignment of Deed of Trust, which was recorded by Defendant MERS, the beneficiary under the original Deed of Trust.  (Defendants’ RJN, Exhibit 2.)  The Court takes judicial notice of this document’s recordation as well as its legal effect.  Fontenot v. Wells Fargo Bank (2011) 198 Cal.App.4th 256, 265. 

 

  • As to the 3rd Cause of Action for violation of Civil Code § 2934a(a), erroneously identified by Plaintiffs as Civil Code § 2934(a), this cause of action fails.  Defendant BAYVIEW, as the servicing agent for E*TRADE, was a proper party to execute a Substitution of Trustee to Defendant SEASIDE pursuant to Civil Code § 2934a(a)(1), which provides that a trustee substitution may be done by “all of the beneficiaries under the trust deed.”  Further, any allegations that the foreclosure proceedings are defective due to the Substitution of Trustee being recorded after the Notice of Default was recorded are also without merit.  Civil Code § 2934a(b) and (c) specifically allow for a Substitution of Trustee to be recorded after the recordation of a Notice of Default, but before the Notice of Trustee’s Sale is recorded.     

 

  • As to the 4th Cause of Action for declaratory relief, Plaintiffs have failed to allege an actual, present controversy relating to the parties’ rights and obligations that is a proper subject of declaratory relief.  City of Cotati v. Cashman (2002) 29 Cal.4th 69, 80.  While Plaintiffs assert that the securitization of their loan has caused them harm, the Court in Jenkins v. JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A. (2013) 216 Cal.App.4th 497 found that any alleged securitization issues did not render the plaintiff’s default irrelevant, and thus allegations of improper securitization did not give rise to an actual, present controversy involving the plaintiff.  Id. at 515. 

 

  • As to the 5th Cause of Action for violation of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing, Plaintiffs fail to allege an existing, specific contractual obligation giving rise to this claim.  Barroso v. Ocwen Loan Servicing, LLC (2012) 208 Cal.App.4th 1001, 1015. 

 

  • As to the 6th Cause of Action for violation of Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200, while Plaintiffs allege that Defendants engaged in various fraudulent activities in connection with Plaintiffs’ mortgage note, no specific facts are alleged to support this claim. 

 

  • As to the 7th Cause of Action for equitable estoppel, the Demurrer is sustained without leave to amend on the ground that no such independent cause of action is recognized in California.  Behnke v. State Farm General Ins. Co. (2011) 196 Cal.App.4th 1445, 1463. 

 

·         Defendants’ Request for Judicial Notice is GRANTED as to Exhibit 9.  The request is GRANTED as to the remainder of the exhibits insofar as they were duly recorded in the official records of the County of San Mateo or are records from the Bankruptcy Court for the Northern District of California as well as their legal effects.  Fontenot, supra at 265. 

 

·         Demurring party is directed to prepare a written order consistent with the Court’s ruling for the Court’s signature, pursuant to California Rules of Court, Rule 3.1312, and provide notice thereof to the opposing party/counsel as required by law and the California Rules of Court.  The order is to be submitted directly to Judge Elizabeth K. Lee, Department 17.

 

_____________________________________________________________________

9:00

9

CIV 529488       PMI MORTGAGE INSURANCE CO. VS. CHRISTINE LIANG

 

 

PMI MORTGAGE INSURANCE CO.            RUDY GABA

CHRISTINE LIANG                       STEVEN S. MIYAKE

 

 

MOTION TO QUASH SERVICE OF SUMMONS AND COMPLAINT BY CHRISTINE LIANG

 

 

·         The uncontested Motion to Quash Service of the Summons and Complaint, filed by Defendant Christine Liang, is GRANTED. 

 

·         Defendant has established by a preponderance of the evidence that she was not served with copies of the Summons and Complaint.  Plaintiff has not submitted any evidence in opposition to the Motion to Quash and has not rebutted the evidence submitted by Defendant.

 

·         If the tentative ruling is uncontested, it shall become the order of the Court, pursuant to Rule 3.1308(a)(1), adopted by Local Rule 3.10, effective immediately, and no formal order pursuant to Rule 3.1312 or any other notice is required as the tentative ruling affords sufficient notice to the parties. 

 

_____________________________________________________________________

9:00

10

CIV 529725       ACACIABANK VS. MANDY LEE TAM

 

 

ACACIABANK                            CHRISTOPHER R. NELSON

MANDY LEE TAM

 

 

ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE WHY ORDER FOR SALE OF DWELLING SHOULD NOT BE MADE BY ACACIABANK

 

 

·         Plaintiff/Judgment Creditor AcaciaBank’s Application for an Order for Sale of Real Property is GRANTED pursuant to CCP § 704.780(b).

 

·         Plaintiff has met the requirements for issuance of an order to sell as set forth in CCP §§ 704.750 – 704.770.  Proper notice has been given. 

·         If the tentative ruling is uncontested, it shall become the order of the Court, pursuant to Rule 3.1308(a)(1), adopted by Local Rule 3.10, effective immediately, and no formal order pursuant to Rule 3.1312 or any other notice is required as the tentative ruling affords sufficient notice to the parties. 

 

_____________________________________________________________________

9:00

11

CLJ 486035       GENNADIY SHAPIRO, ET AL. VS. FRANCISCO ENAGE, ET AL.

 

 

GENNADIY SHAPIRO                      BRIAN L. LARSEN

FRANCISCO ENAGE                       ANGELA F. STOREY

 

 

MOTION TO DISMISS FOR FAILURE TO PROSECUTE WITHIN STATUTORY TIME FRAME BY FRANCISCO ENAGE AND MARIA FELIZA ENAGE

 

 

·         Defendants Francisco Enage and Maria Feliza Enage’s Motion to Dismiss for Failure to Prosecute is GRANTED pursuant to CCP § 583.360(b).  More than 5 years have passed since the Complaint was filed on July 20, 2009, and Plaintiffs have made no effort to bring this matter to trial.

 

·         If the tentative ruling is uncontested, it shall become the order of the Court, pursuant to Rule 3.1308(a)(1), adopted by Local Rule 3.10, effective immediately, and no formal order pursuant to Rule 3.1312 or any other notice is required as the tentative ruling affords sufficient notice to the parties. 

 

_____________________________________________________________________

9:00

12

CLJ 526381       UNIFUND CCR, LLC VS. VICENTE P. MAQUINANA

 

 

UNIFUND CCR, LLC                      MANUEL E. IGNACIO

VICENTE P. MAQUINANA                  PRO/PER

 

 

MOTION FOR ORDER THAT TRUTH OF MATTERS SPECIFIED IN REQUESTS FOR ADMISSIONS BE DEEMED ADMITTED AND FOR MONETARY SANCTIONS BY UNIFUND CCR, LLC

 

 

·         Plaintiff UNIFUND CCR, LLC’s Motion for Order That: (1) Truth of Matters Specified in Requests for Admissions Be Deemed Admitted and (2) Imposing Monetary Sanctions are GRANTED pursuant to CCP § 2033.280.  Plaintiff served Defendant with relevant discovery over six months ago, and Defendant has still not responded.  All those matters in Plaintiff’s Request for Admissions, Set No. 1, served on March 11, 2014, are hereby deemed admitted.  Defendant is also ordered to pay Plaintiff $60 in monetary sanctions pursuant to CCP § 2033.280(c).

 

·         If the tentative ruling is uncontested, it shall become the order of the Court, pursuant to Rule 3.1308(a)(1), adopted by Local Rule 3.10, effective immediately, and no formal order pursuant to Rule 3.1312 or any other notice is required as the tentative ruling affords sufficient notice to the parties. 

 


 

 

In the Superior Court of the State of California

In and for the County of San Mateo

 

Presiding Judge Law and Motion Calendar

Judge: HONORABLE ROBERT D FOILES

Department 21

 

400 County Center, Redwood City

Courtroom 2J

 

SEPTEMBER 12, 2014

 

If you plan to appear on any case on this calendar,

 you must call (650) 261-5121 before 4:00 p.m. and you must give notice also before 4:00 p.m. to all parties of your intent to appear pursuant to California Rules of Court 3.1308(a)(1).

 

Case                   Title / Nature of Case

9:00

1

CIV 528578       KATHRYN DEGROOT, ET AL. VS. SERENITY 4 MANAGEMENT

                   SERVICES, LLC, ET AL.

 

 

KATHRYN DEGROOT                       KARMAN RATLIFF

SERENITY 4 MANAGEMENT SERVICES, LLC   VINCENT W. MARSELLA

 

 

MOTION FOR PREFERENTIAL TRIAL SETTING BY KATHRYN DEGROOT

 

 

·         Matter off calendar.  

 

_____________________________________________________________________

9:00

2

CIV 528920       GLENN ENGLAND VS. LYNDON RIVE, ET AL.

 

 

GLENN ENGLAND                         ROBERT S. GREEN

LYNDON RIVE                           IGNACIO E. SALCEDA

 

 

COMPLEX CASE STATUS CONFERENCE

 

 

·         Appear.  

 

_____________________________________________________________________

9:00

3

CIV 529546       SKYWEST AIRLINES, INC. VS. COUNTY OF SAN MATEO, ET

                   AL.

 

 

SKYWEST AIRLINES, INC.                C. STEPHEN DAVIS

COUNTY OF SAN MATEO

 

 

COMPLEX CASE STATUS CONFERENCE

 

 

·         Matter off calendar.  Stipulation staying case is granted.  

 

_____________________________________________________________________

9:00

4

CIV 529564       ERIC JACKSON VS. G.C. MICRO CORPORATION

 

 

ERIC JACKSON                          ROBERT S. NELSON

G.C. MICRO CORPORATION

 

 

COMPLEX CASE STATUS CONFERENCE

 

 

·         Appear.  

 

_____________________________________________________________________

9:01

5

CIV 513873       THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF CA VS. FRANK FIGONI

 

 

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF CA         DISTRICT ATTORNEY

FRANK FIGONI                          PAULA CANNY

 

 

MOTION TO CONTINUE TRIAL BY FRANK FIGONI

 

 

·         Appear.  

 


 

 

 

 


POSTED:  3:25 PM

 

© 2014 Superior Court of San Mateo County